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INTRODUCTION

When the battered women's movement grew out of the broader
feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 1 victims
of domestic violence faced monumental practical and political
obstacles. No term for intimate abuse existed in the national
lexicon; virtually no shelters or safe houses devoted to battered
women had been established; no civil laws had been enacted to deal
with the emergency aftermath of an abusive incident; and the
government had a long track record of ignoring the problem or even
protecting perpetrators.2
Over the past thirty years, movement activists have focused their
energies on revolutionizing the terms of the debate, turning
domestic violence into a widely condemned practice, and transforming the responses of police, prosecutors, and the courts. Their
efforts resulted in major legal reforms that have substantially
expanded and improved the justice system's responsiveness to
victims.
Given the enormous barriers that once confronted battered
women-and still confront them today"-it is hardly surprising that
most scholars, policymakers, and activists have been relatively
unconcerned that most recent reforms have reduced the level of
procedural justice accorded to batterers. Although no conscious
strategic decision was made to target batterers' sense of fair and
respectful treatment by authorities, that is in fact what has
happened.
The wisdom of this approach-promoting responsiveness to
battered women at the expense of providing fair treatment for
perpetrators-must be questioned in light of an emerging body of
social science research. Although infrequently raised in discussions
of criminological theory, social psychologists have developed a rich
1. As Elizabeth Schneider explains, 'The batteredwomen's movement defined battering
within the larger framework of gender subordination. Domestic violence was linked to
women's inferior position within the family, discrimination within the workplace, wage
inequity, lack of educational opportunities, the absence of social supports for mothering, and
the lack ofchild care." ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATIERaDWOMEN&FEMINISTLAWMAKING
23(2000).
2. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:Rethinking the
Roles ofProsecutors,Judges, andthe CourtSystem, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINIM 3, 9-11 (1999).
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understanding of the psychology of authority. Researchers evaluating why people obey the law have found that the manner in
which an official directive is reached has an independent, and
often more powerful, effect than does the outcome of the directive
itself.3 The likelihood of a person's compliance with the dictates of
police and probation officers, or with court orders issued in civil or
criminal cases, is at least as firmly rooted in his perception of fair
process as in his satisfaction with the ultimate result.
This idea may seem counterintuitive in a culture steeped in
deterrence theory, which holds that compliance with the law is
based predominantly on a self-interested analysis of whether the
benefits of obedience outweigh the costs." But procedural justice
research indicates that the use of fair procedures-allowing a
person to state their views, ensuring that their perspective is taken
seriously, and demonstrating that officials maintain an open mind
about this person and their case-enhances a person's sense that
authorities are moral and legitimate.5 This perception facilitates a
person's sense of self-worth and, in turn, his degree of compliance,
even when this conflicts with immediate self-interest.6
How has this critical loss of procedural justice occurred? In the
criminal system, an ever-growing number of jurisdictions have
adopted a series of discretionless policies, including: mandatory
arrests, which require police to arrest in domestic violence cases;
no-drop prosecutions, which require that a criminal case go forward
regardless of the victim's wishes; and mandatory stay-away orders,
which require perpetrators to stay away from victims during the
pendency of a prosecution. These developments, along with other
system reforms, create a relatively uniform government response,
but also reduce the ability of state actors to tailor their actions in
response to individual circumstances. This, in turn, reduces the
likelihood that defendants will voice their version of events,
perceive they are being treated with respect, and feel that state
authorities are attempting to be fair.

3. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text.
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On the civil side, a recently convened panel of national experts
drafted the Model State Code on Domestic and Family Violence,
which recommends extensive expansion ofjudicial power in protection order cases.7 The Model Code authorizes short-term, emergency
protection orders on the basis of second-hand, unsworn accounts
provided by police officers over the telephone.' It further authorizes
permanent protective orders of indefinite duration, in the absence
of either prior notice to the perpetrator or an ex ante opportunity
for the accused9 to be heard.10 These provisions would permit a
highly unusual end-run around long established notions of due
process in civil cases.
To date, reformers have sought to protect victims regardless
of the impact on batterers, and have paid little attention to the
potentially close connection between victim safety and abusers'
sense of fair treatment. But because procedurally flawed policies
are likely to undermine abuser compliance with official directives,
a new focus is necessary for victims' long-term protection. Of
course, treating defendants with neutrality, respect, and consistency is solidly grounded in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
morality, and decency. If such treatment also improves compliance,
however, it is of special importance to intimate partner abuse cases,
where repetitive, escalating violence is a predictable scenario for
most victims."
Part I of this Article documents the recent legal reforms implemented on behalf of battered women in the criminal and civil justice
systems. These include warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest laws,
7. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
9. The vast majority of domestic violence cases involve male perpetrators and female
targets. Although cases exist in which the sex roles are reversed, or involve, same-sex
intimate abuse, I will refer to perpetrators as male and targets as female.
10. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
11. Primarily because relatively few domestic violence activists, academics, and
policymakers appear to be seriously concerned with procedural fairness for accused
perpetrators, this Article focuses on the direct impact of such fairness on the victim. In my
experience of almost twenty years in the movement, I have found that moral and
philosophical arguments for fairness to batterers typically receive a less-than-warm
reception. If key individuals are to modify their strategies for addressing the problem of
intimate partner abuse by increasing proceduraljustice for batterers, many ofthem must be
convinced that such reforms ultimately will promote victim safety.
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and no-drop prosecution policies, as well as civil protection order

statutes and statutory modifications recommended by the Model
State Code on Domestic and Family Violence. Part II describes
the ways in which these reforms have improved the state's
responsiveness to victims, yet simultaneously entailed serious costs
by diminishing batterers' perceptions of procedural justice. Part III
defines the building blocks of procedural justice and reviews the
social science data demonstrating its importance for increasing
batterers' compliance with legal directives. In addition, Part III
argues this research indicates that those concerned with victim
safety cannot ignore batterers' perceptions of fairness. The implications of this idea are explored in Part IV, with suggestions for
reforms to foster a sense of fair process for perpetrators. Police and
prosecutors must provide defendants with expanded opportunities
to feel heard and respected, while simultaneously improving
advocacy services for victims. Defense attorneys must take advantage of their special position of trust to encourage batterers to
comply with legal dictates. Judges must communicate greater
respect for and understanding of defendants, particularly in pro se
contexts. And in civil protection order cases, defendants must
receive more and better information and must have access to a
more individually tailored, responsive pretrial negotiation process.
Finally, Part V explores two cautionary notes to this analysis. First,
the special characteristics of the batterer population-including
information-processing deficits that result in misconstrual of social
stimuli-may distinguish abusers from the other research groups.
Second, victims themselves also may play a crucial role in batterer
compliance-a potentially confounding factor to consider in future
studies.
Working to improve the conditions abusers face has long been
considered taboo in the battered women's movement. As one
example, the 1994 and 2000 federal Violence Against Women Acts
appropriated millions of dollars for state and local programs to
reduce domestic violence. 2 But in response to activist demands,
12. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 3789p, 3796gg-2); Violence Against Women Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 16, 18,28, 42 U.S.C. and FED. R. EVID. 412).
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both statutes strictly prohibit the expenditure of any monies on
batterer counseling or other preventive services for perpetrators."3
This approach to protecting battered women is short-sighted.
Ultimately, the safety of domestic violence victims is directly linked
to the perceptions and experiences of their intimate partners.

I. IMPROVING THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO BATTERED WOMEN AT THE
EXPENSE OF PERPETRATORS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL

JUSTICE
As the battered women's movement took shape in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, it rapidly became clear that domestic violence was
far too serious and widespread to be resolved solely in the private
realm through shelters, empowerment groups, and community
education workshops.1 4 Battering by husbands, ex-husbands, or
lovers is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United
States,15 and accounts for thirty-one percent of all murders of
women. 16 Physical aggression occurs in at least one out of four
marriages, and comparable rates exist among couples who are
living together, engaged, or dating.1 7 Domaestic violence is also a
major contributing factor to other social ills such as child abuse and
neglect, female alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, attempted

13. Id.
14. E.g., SUSANSCRECHTER, WOMENAND MALEVIOLENCE: THEVISIONSAND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATI'ERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 29-52 (1982).

15. Susan A. MacManus & Nikki R. Van Hightower, Limits of State Constitutional
Guarantees:LessonsFrom Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies,49 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 269, 269 (1989).
16. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS (1989).
17. Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne, Viwlence in Marriage, in 11 CRIME AND
JUSTICE-A REVIEW OF RESEARCH= FAmILY VIOLENCE 163, 177-80 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael
Tonry eds., 1989); Jan E. Stets & Murray A. Straus, The Marriage License as a Hitting
License: A ComparisonofAssaults in Dating,Cohabitingand MarriedCouples, in PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE IN AmERICAN FA~MES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145

FAMAlIES 95, 110 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990) (stating that 161 out of
1000 couples experienced one or more physical assaults on a partner during 1985 alone);
Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, How ViolentAre American Families?Estimatesfrom
the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN

AMERICANFAMILIES, supra,at227, 231-33; David B. Sugarman & GeraldT. HotalingDating
Violence: Prevalence, Context, and Risk Markers, in VIOLENCE IN DATING RELATIONSHIPS:
EMERGING SOCIAL ISSUES 3, 6-7 (Maureen A. Pirog-Good & Jan E. Stets eds., 1989).
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suicide, and homelessness."8 But a history of strong opposition
to-or deep ambivalence about-state intervention in family
violence cases has long undermined any meaningful government
response.
For hundreds of years, the law explicitly endorsed domestic
violence, upholding a husband's right to physically "chastise" his
wife.1 9 Not until the late nineteenth century did most states begin
to move away from this position.2" Even then, many continued to
assert that in the absence of "serious" violence, the government

18. NATL CT. FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, TILLVIOLENCE Do US PART 26 (1993); Jane H.
Pfouts, Violent Families:Coping Responses ofAbused Wives, 57 CHILD WELFARE 101 (1978).
19. In the words of the Mississippi Supreme Court, this rule allowed a husband to "use
salutary restraints in every case of [a wife's] misbehaviour, without being subjected to
vexatious prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned."
Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157 (1824); see also State v. Black, 60 N.C. (1 Win.)
262 (1864) (permitting a husband "to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself, and unless some
permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or such a degree of cruelty
as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the
domestic forum, or go behind the curtain"); cf. Robbins v. State, 20 Ala. 36, 39 (1852) ("[Ihf
the husband was at the time... provoked to this unmanly [assault] by the bad behaviour and
misconduct of his wife, he should not be visited with the same punishment as if he had
without provocation wantonly and brutally injured one whom it was his duty to nourish and
protect."). The first law against wife beating during this period was enacted in Tennessee in
1850, although it is not known whether this statute was enforced. Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal
Approaches to Family Violence, 1640-1980, in 11 CRIME AND JUSTICE-A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH, supra note 17, at 19, 29, 32. In some instances, sporadic periods of social
awareness concerning domestic violence led to legislative prohibitions in the early 1600s, but
no such laws were passed from 1672 to 1850. Id. at 29.
20. E.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (stating that the privilege to
chastise one's wife, "ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law"); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458,461 (1871) (declaring
that "[bleating or striking a wife violently.., is not one of the rights conferred on a husband
by the marriage"); Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221, 223 (1875) (noting that a husband's right
of control over his wife does not extend to punishment and correction, but is limited to
protection and self-defense).
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should not interfere in the private realm of the family.21 This view
predominated in most jurisdictions well into the twentieth century.
Given the long legacy of state protection of and deference to those
who abuse their intimate partners, it is hardly surprising that
promoting procedural fairness for batterers was of little interest to
activists, academics, and policymakers. Instead, these groups
focused on improving and expanding the justice system's responsiveness to victims in need of protection. Although there was no
conscious strategic decision to target and reduce batterers' sense
of fair and respectful treatment by authorities, many of the
movement's most successful reforms, both individually and taken
as a whole, have had precisely that impact.
A. The Move Towards Mandatesin the CriminalJustice System
1. The Police:Expanded MisdemeanorArrest Powers and
MandatoryArrest Laws
Until the 1990s, police officers typicallyignored domestic violence
calls or purposely delayed their response by several hours.22 When
a complainant called 911 to report that "my boyfriend is mad at me
and is going to beat me up," she would be told, "Call us again when
he does."' Victims who called the police after the perpetrator had
21. As late as 1874, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "Ifno permanent injury
has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is
better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and
forgive." State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874); see also State v. Buckley, 2 Del. (2 Harr.)
552,552 (1838) ("We know ofno law that will authorize a husband to strike his pregnant wife
a blow with his fist, such as has been inflicted on this woman.... [Amny undue or excessive
battery by a husband of his wife either in degree, or with improper means, [is] indictable.")
(emphasis added); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123 (1852) (ruling a wife's testimony
against her husband incompetent in all cases of assault and battery, expect where "lasting
injury or great bodily harm" is either threatened or inflicted); Richards v. Richards, 1 Grant
389, 392-93 (Pa. 1857) (denying a divorce petition on ground that "[ilt is a sickly sensibility
which holds that a man may not lay hands on his wife, even rudely, if necessary, to prevent
the commission of some unlawful or criminal purpose ... a manmay... be betrayed into the
commission of an act, or a harsh expression, for which, in a moment after, he might be
repentant and sorrowful").
22. DELMARTIN, BATERED WIVES 93 (1976); MURRAYA. STRAusETAL., BEHmND CLOSED
DOORS: VIOLENcE IN THE AmERiCAN FAMILY 232-33 (1980).
23. Elaine Cumming et al., PolicemanasPhilosopher,Guide and Friend,12 SOC. PROB.
276, 281 (1965).
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left the scene were commonly advised to "lock the door" or "go stay
with mother;" no police car would be dispatched.24 When officers did
respond, they were trained to mediate and to "avoid arrest if
possible." 5 As one police training bulletin explained:
The police role in a [domestic] dispute situation is more often
that of a mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law....
Normally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall
be avoided ... but [when] one of the parties demands arrest, you

should attempt to explain the ramifications of such action (e.g.,
loss ofwages, bail procedures, court appearances) and encourage
the parties to reason with each other."
Arrests were rare; studies estimate that they occurred in only
three to fourteen percent of all intimate partner cases to which
officers actually responded." Battered women were left with little
or no access to the criminal justice system.

24. Raymond Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family
Violence, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 539, 546 (1971); Raymond I. Parnas, The Police
Response to the Domestic Disturbance,1967 WIs. L. REv. 914, 922-24.
25. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 94 (citing Sue Eisenberg & Patricia Micklow, The
Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited 112 (1974) (unpublished paper, on file with the
University of Michigan). The Michigan Police Training Academy procedures taught recruits
to:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
(1) Complainant must sign complaint.
(2) Must appear in court.
(3) Consider loss of time.
(4) Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
(1) Court not in session.
(2) No judge available.
f. Don't be too harsh or critical.
Id.
26. Id. at 94-95 (quoting CITY OF OAKLAND POLICE SERVS., Techniques of Dispute
Intervention,in TRAINING BULLETIN III-J, at 2, 3 (1975)).
27. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii, xvi (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1992) (citing numerous studies of domestic violence arrest rates).
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In the mid-1970s, improving police responsiveness became a top
priority of anti-domestic violence activists. 2 Advocates successfully
promoted reforms that improved responsiveness to victims but
simultaneously reduced the degree of process previously accorded
to suspects at a crime scene. 9
First, state legislatures changed the standards governing
warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases. Traditionally, in the
absence of a warrant a police officer could arrest in only two
situations: (1) where there was probable cause to believe a felony
had occurred; and (2) where a misdemeanor occurred in the officer's
presence.3 0 Because most domestic violence offenses were charged
as misdemeanors and occurred before the police arrived on the
scene, timely arrests rarely were possible.31 By 1983, twenty-eight
states had authorized warrantless arrests if there was probable
cause to believe a misdemeanor domestic violence offense had
occurred.3 2
This reform effort was fueled in large part by a highly publicized
study conducted by researchers Lawrence Sherman and Richard
Berk in 1984. 33 Dubbed the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, the study analyzed the impact of arrest on
recidivism.3" Based on a sample of 314 cases, the study indicated
28. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence Is Not Conclusive:Arrest
Is No Panacea,in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ONFAMILYVIOLENCE 337,341 (Richard J. Gelles
&Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) (noting that political pressure to increase arrests has come
primarily from battered women's activists and feminists).
29. Id.
30. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (1989); see also 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: ATREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(b)
(3d ed. 1996); Joan Zorza, The CriminalLaw ofMisdemeanorDomestic Violence, 1970-1990,
83 J. CRim. L. & CRIMuNOLOGY 46,61 (1992) (stating that this rule applied in most, but not
all jurisdictions in the mid-1970s); cf D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (1991) (authorizing arrest
if the officer has probable cause to believe that an interfamily offense resulted in physical
injury, or caused, or was intended to cause, reasonable fear of imminent serious physical
injury or death); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2 (1983) (authorizing arrest when an officer has
reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed).
31. Arrests are far less likely to be made after law enforcement officials leave the scene
of a crime. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BuZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

RESPONSE, 42, 93-94 (2d ed. 1996).
32. Zorza, supra note 30, at 62 (citing Lisa Lerman & Franci Livingston, State
Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE 4, 5 (1983)).
33. Lawrence W. Sherman &RichardA. Berk, The SpeciflcDeterrentEffectsofArrestfor
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
34. Id.
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that arrest dramatically reduced the risk of re-assault against the
same victim over a six month follow-up period, as compared with
alternative police responses of either separating the parties for a
brief period or "advising" them (a process ranging from doing
nothing to mediating)."5 Sherman and Berk concluded that arrest
was the most effective means of reducing recidivist intimate partner violence. 6
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment had a profound
influence on public policy.37 In 1984, the same year the study's
results were publicized, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on
Family Violence issued a report recommending arrest as the
standard response to all cases of misdemeanor domestic assault. 8
By 1988, a survey conducted by the Victim Services Agency showed
that only two states, Alabama and West Virginia, continued to
prohibit9 warrantless arrest in misdemeanor domestic violence
3

cases.

Second, in addition to broadening police officers' discretionary
arrest powers, jurisdictions began to enact laws requiringarrest in
domestic abuse cases where an officer has probable cause to believe
the offender has committed an assault, or has placed a victim to
whom a protection order had been issued in fear of imminent
serious physical injury. Oregon passed the first mandatory arrest
statute in 1977,40 and other jurisdictions soon followed suit. By
35. Six months after the initial police response, official records showed that domestic
abuse recurred in 10% of arrest cases, 24% of separation cases, and 19% of advice cases. Id.
at 267. Victim interviews offered a slightly different picture; they reported recidivist abuse
in 19% of arrest cases, 33%of separation cases, and 37% of advice cases. Id at 267-68.
36. Id. at 270 (statingthat"an arrest should be made unless there are good, clear reasons
why an arrest would be counterproductive"). Because researchers were unable to replicate
the results of this study in six subsequent trials, policy decisions based on these data are now
subject to significant controversy. See infra text accompanying notes 174-84.
37. Domestic Violence: Terrorism In the Home: Hearing before the Sen. Subcomm. on
Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
101st Cong. 88-92 (1990) (statement of Eli J. Miletich, Chief of Police, Duluth, Minnesota);
U.S. ATrY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILYVIOLENCE, FINAL REP. 24 & n.17, 104 & n.21

(1984).
38. U.S. ATr'Y GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILYVIOLENCE, FINAL REP. 17(1984).
39. Zorza, supranote 30, at 63 (citing VICTIM SERVICES AGENCY, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE TO FAMILYVIOLENCE: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO FAMILYVIOLENCE LEGISLATION

(1988)). Both of these states now permit warrantless arrest. ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1995); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1002 (Michie 2001).
40. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.055(2), 133.310(3) (1999).
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1982, five states had enacted mandatory arrest laws;4 1 by 1994,
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had done the
same.

42

These reforms created an astonishing reversal in law
enforcement policy. The long-standing nonintervention protocol was
replaced with greater arrest powers than in any other category of
crime, coupled with a strict duty to use that power.4" In the process,
perpetrators moved from a position of privilege to one in which their

41. Zorza, supranote 30, at 64 (citing LISA LERMAN, CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES,

COURT DECISIONS ON WIFE ABUSE LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 21 (1982)).
42. Presently, the following states mandate arrest when there is probable cause to
believe that a violation of a protection order has occurred. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(2)
(Michie 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(d) (West Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-104
(2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (West
Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §
6 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15b (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518B.01, subd. 14 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.070(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2521(a)(3) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(C) (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 140.7.1-11(1) (1997 & Supp. 2001); OHIo REV. CODEANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001);
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1999); 23 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN § 6113 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(1) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3611(a)(2) (1996); TEx. CR=M PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-6-8 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2Xa) (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 48.-508 (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(7)(b) (West 1994 & Supp.
2000).
The following states currently mandate arrest when there is a finding of domestic violence
regardless of whether a protection order has been violated: ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(1)
(Michie 2000); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-3601(B) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b38b(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. §
236.12(2) (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 4012 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-21(a)(1) (West 1995); Offo REV. CODEANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); O1L
REV. STAT. § 133.310(6) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Michie 1998 & Supp.
2001); TEL CRI PROC. CODEANN. § 14.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30.6-S
(1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(c) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4827-1002 (Michie 2001).
43. Of course, changes in policy do not always translate into changes in practice. Many
officers resented their loss of discretion through mandatory arrest laws. One common law
enforcement response to this loss was "dual arrest." Officers responding to a scene where
both parties have sustained injuries fail to discriminate between those inflicted offensively
and those inflicted defensively. Although the latter typically constitute evidence of selfdefense, rather than a criminal act, the officers simply arrest both parties. This tactic
directly undermines the intent of the mandatory arrest statutes. Donna M. Welch,
MandatoryArrest ofDomestic Abusers: Panaceaor Perpetuationof the Problem ofAbuse?,
43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1159 (1994).

1856

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1843

procedural protections were more constricted than those who
committed crimes against strangers. Those subjected to the new
arrest policies, in conjunction with their lawyers, denounced the
reforms as an unfair infringement on their civil liberties."
Although some activists and scholars oppose legislative mandates
on a variety of grounds, 45 broad support for expanded police powers
remains strong today. In 1994, the federal Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA)" included a provision requiring mandatory arrest or
pro-arrest policies as a condition for receipt of funding by state and
local governments.4 This provision remained unchanged in 2000 as
part of VAWA II.' Experts in the field continue to cite mandatory
arrest policies as evidence of the success of the battered women s
movement.49

44. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
45. A handful of scholars and activists have voiced opposition to legislative mandates,
particularly in the criminal justice system, on the ground that they inhibit the system's
ability to respond to a survivor in the particular context of her individual life. A cookie-cutter,
one-size-fits-all response to such complex and dangerous situations places a subgroup of
battered women in substantial psychological and physical danger. E.g., Epstein, supranote
2, at 18-19; Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999). Similarly, a persistent minority of battered
women's activists have opposed mandatory arrest and/or prosecution on victim-safety
grounds. E.g., CHICAGO METRO. BATTERED WOMEN'S NETWORK, POSITION PAPER OPPOSING
ENACTMENT OF MANDATORYARREST LAW IN DOMNESTICVIOLENCE CASES 1 (1995) (on file with
author).
46. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 16, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C. and FED. R. EvID. 412).

47. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1XA) (1994) (requiring eligible grantees to certify that their
laws or official policies "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based
on probable cause that an offense has been committed"). Battered women's advocates offered
strong support for this provision. See Domestic Violence: Terrorism In the Home: Hearing
Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Comm. on
Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. 12-26 (1990); id. at 32-44 (statement of Mary Pat
Brygger, Nat'l Woman Abuse Prevention Project) (statement of Sarah M. Buel, Harvard
Legal Aid Bureau).
48. Violence Against WomenAct of2000, Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 37 89 p, 3796gg-2).
49. See generally Evan Stark, Re-PresentingWoman Battering:FromBattered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 976-77 (1995); Machaela M. Hoctor,
Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for MandatoryArrest
in California,85 CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Marion Davis, The Rhode Island CoalitionAgainst
Domestic Violence CelebratesIts 20th Anniversary, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 10, 1999, at
1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, Prvjnl File.; Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6, at 23.
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2. The Prosecution:No-Drop Policiesand Mandatory Criminal
Stay-Away Legislation
Increasing arrest rates did not prove to be, by itself, a sufficient
criminal justice system response. Across the country, prosecutors
rarely pressed charges in domestic violence cases and, when they
did, they rarely followed through by bringing the case to trial.50
Indeed, they often actively discouraged victims from pursuing relief
in the criminal justice system.5 1 District Attorneys explained that
"because victims simply do not follow through in domestic violence
cases, there is no need to waste precious prosecutorial resources on
them."5 2 In addition, domestic violence crimes were notoriously
undercharged; a National Crime Survey found that over one-third
of misdemeanor partner abuse cases would have been charged as
felony rapes, robberies, or aggravated assaults if they had been
committed by strangers."
During the 1980s and 1990s, victim advocates lobbied
aggressively and successfully to change these policies in many
jurisdictions. 5 Today, many prosecutor's offices in major urban
centers have adopted aggressive "no-drop" prosecution policies:55
cases proceed even when a victim recants her original story and
testifies for the defense.55 In cases where the victim does not wish
50. Epstein, supranote 2, at 15-16; David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal
Prosecutionof WifeAssaulters:Process,Problems,and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE
ASSAUmt. CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 127, 129-30 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993).
51. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 130, 141.
52. Naomi R. Calm, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Crimes:An Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLEINCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE
161, 163 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992); see also Ford & Regoli, supranote
50, at 141. One study of domestic abuse cases found that in forty-five percent of the cases the
primary reason for the failure to go forward was the victim's wishes. Id. at 151. This
traditional approach is fundamentally flawed, because it is virtually impossible for the
prosecutor to discern whether the victim is dropping charges of her own free will or with a
literal or figurative gun to her head.
53. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supranote 31, at 56.
54. In a recent survey, sixty-six percent of prosecutors offices in major urban centers
reported that they had adopted such policies. Donald J. Rebovich, ProsecutionResponse to
Domestic Violence: Results of a Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in Do ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 176, 182-83 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).

55. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998).
56. For an insightful discussion ofno-drop prosecution policies, within the framework of
feminist theory, see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: MandatedVictim Participationin

1858

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1843

to cooperate, prosecuting attorneys pursue alternative litigation
strategies, treating domestic violence cases as they would
homicides, where the victim is, by definition, unavailable at trial.5"
The government relies on evidence such as recorded 911 calls
containing excited utterances, photographs and hospital records
documenting injuries, and testimony from police officers who
responded to the crime scene.58 These strategies have proven quite
successful. In Washington, D.C., for example, the U.S. Attorney's
Office introduces such evidence in every domestic violence case in
which it is available, and relies on it exclusively half of the time, in
cases where the victim declines to testify for the state. 59 The
conviction rate in both types of cases is identical.6 0
Other mandates are becoming popular in domestic violence
prosecutions as well. For example, several state legislatures now
require the issuance of a no-contact order as a condition of pretrial
release in intimate partner abuse cases.61 This requirement is
triggered regardless of the individual victim's preference or the
prosecutor's request, and can last for several months or more.62
B. ProposedDue ProcessReductions in the Civil Justice System
The battered women's movement has accomplished substantial
reforms in the civil justice system as well. A mere thirty years ago,
virtually no legislation existed to protect battered women from their
abusive partners. Today, every state has a civil protection order
statute, and the vast majority of these authorize the essential relief
Domestic Violence Prosecutions,109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996).
57. E.g., Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police
Officer and the Prosecutor,20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 300-03 (1993) (describing steps taken
to prosecute a domestic violence case without the participation of the victim).
58. Id. Mary E. Asmus et al., ProsecutingDomesticAbuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective ProsecutionStrategiesfrom UnderstandingtheDynamicsofAbusiveRelationships,
15 FHAMN L. REV. 115, 139-49 (1991); Cahn, supranote 52, at 174.
59. Telephone Interview with Robert Spagnoletti, Chief,U.S. Attorney's Office, Domestic
Violence Unit (Sept. 3, 1997).
60. Id.
61. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-4(a)(1) (2000); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 25-10-23 (Michie
1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (1999). But see WIS. STAT. §§ 968.075(5)(c), (6) (1998)
(building in some victim discretion by allowing her to waive the "stay away" requirement
within seventy-two hours of an arrest).
62. See supranote 61 (citing statutes).
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63
necessary for battered women to leave an abusive relationship.
These statutes provide for emergency ex parte relief,6 4 no-assault
and stay-away provisions, temporary child custody, safe visitation
arrangements for the noncustodial parent, and child support.6" In
most jurisdictions, these orders remain in effect for one to three
years6 6 and may be extended upon a demonstration of continued

63. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, ProvidingLegal Protectionfor Battered
Women: An Analysis ofState Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810, 910-11
(1993); see alsoDevelopments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 1498, 1509-14, 1530-33 (1993).
64. Klein&Orloff,supranote 63, at 1031-43 (statingthat alljurisdictions authorize some
form of emergency ex parte relief upon filing a complaint for civil protection). Emergency ex
parte relief provides a victim with court-ordered protection during the potentially volatile
period between the time of filing a lawsuit and trial. Id. at 1031-34. This is the period when
the abusive partner typically is served with court papers spelling out the victim's intent to
leave him-a moment that can set off a particularly severe "separation assault." Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of BatteredWomen: Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 65-71 (1991); see also Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 274-75 (1995) (stating that
domestic violence escalates when a victim leaves or an abuser believes she is going to leave).
65. The vast majority ofjurisdictions authorize the court to award temporary custody.
Klein & Orloff, supranote 63, at 954 n.968 (citing statutes from forty-two states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico); see also N.Y. FAM. Or. ACT § 842 (Consol. 1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2001). The same is true for visitation. Klein & Orloff,
supra note 63, at 982 n.1141 (citing statutes from thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(9) (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1279.1(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2001). Thirty-seven states and Puerto Rico expressly authorize the
award of child support in a civil protection order case. Klein & Orloff, supranote 63, at 998
n.1254 (citing statutes from thirty-five states and Puerto Rico); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 842 (Consol. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(c)(6) (Supp. 2000).
Rapid resolution of child support issues is critical. One of the primary reasons that victims
return to their abusive partners is the pressure created by the loss of economic support; for
a woman with children, a child support award may be the key to freedom. See Martha F.
Davis & Susan J. Kraham, ProtectingWomen's Welfare in the Faceof Wwlence, 22 FORDHAm
URB. L.J. 1141, 1155 (1995); Anne L. Ganley, Domestic Violence: The What, Why and Who,
as Relevant to Civil Court Cases, in THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION 19, 44

(Jacqueline Agtuca et al. eds., 1992); Cris M. Sullivan et al., After the Crisis: A Needs
Assessment of Women Leaving a Domestic Violence Shelter,7 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 267,26768 (1992); see also Epstein, supra note 2, at 11 ("[Slimilarly, because the potential for
renewed violence is greatest during visitation, carefully structured pick up and drop off
provisions, designed to eliminate victim-perpetrator contact, also can have a significant
prophylactic effect.").
66. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(E)(1), (2) (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (Michie 2001); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-3602(K) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 2001); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6345 (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, § 1045(11)(lb) (1999); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1005(d) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5(a) (Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 39-

6311(4) (Michie Supp. 2001); 750 ILL. COIi~P. STAT. 60/220(b) (1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-
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need. In addition, most states have adopted enforcement
mechanisms for protection orders: thirty-eight (and the District of
Columbia) through criminal contempt laws6" and all fifty through
statutes criminalizing protection order violations.6
Despite these successes, serious impediments to judicial implementation of these laws persist. A lack of information about the
2-13(2) (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(2)(e) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603107(d) (Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:2136(F) (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4007(2) (West 1998); MD.
CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 4-506(2)(iii) (Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(i)
(West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, Subd. 6(a), (b) (West Supp. 2001); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.040(1) (West Supp. 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-924(3) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §
33-080 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(VI) (Supp. 2001); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (Gould 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(13)(b) (1999); OKLEA STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 60.4(H) (Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(1) (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(d) (West Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(c)(2) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-470(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-608(a) (1996); TEX FAm. CODE ANN. § 6.506 85.025(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); VA.
CODEANN. § 16.1-279.1(B) (Michie Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 26.50.060(2) (West
Supp. 2001); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4)(3)(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
67. ALA. CODE § 30-5A-6 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 9.50.010(5) (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3602(J) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1998); CAL. PENAL CODE §
166(c)(1) (West Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(7) (2000); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11,
§ 1271A (Supp. 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(g) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(8)(a)
(West Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(a) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1077(1)(g)
(1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312 (Michie Supp. 2001); 750 II. COMP. STAT. 60/223(a) (West
Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (1994); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(1) (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137 (West Supp. 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 4011(2) (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-508(1)
(1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 600.2950(23) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN § 518B.01,
subd. 14(f), (g) (Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (1999); NEV. CT. R. ANN., E.D.C.R.
5.22(g)(2) (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9(II) (Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:29-9 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(B) (Michie Supp. 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
215.51(b) (Consol. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(a) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06
(Supp. 2001); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.02(A) (West Supp. 2000); OI. REV. STAT. §
107.720(4) (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (West Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-153(c) (2000); S.C. CODEANN. § 20-4-60(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-610(a)
(1996); TEX. FAN. CODE ANN. § 6.506 (Vernon Supp. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1108(e)
(Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(6) (West Supp. 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
1-28-107 (Michie 2001); Connecticut v. Murray, 623 A.2d 60 (Conn. 1993).
68. Klein & Orloff, supra note 63, at 1096 n.1835 (citing statutes in forty states and
Puerto Rico); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79 (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 4011(1) (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950(22) (West 2000); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(VII) (Supp. 2001); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.10(4) (Consol. 1996 & Supp.
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-13 (Michie 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (1996).
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social and psychological dynamics of domestic violence causes
many judges to become frustrated with petitioners whom they
perceive as "refusing" to leave the abusive relationship. Operating
under this misperception, they often find the victim's behavior
puzzling and enormously frustrating.69 When a woman files a civil
protection order suit after dropping previous cases, judges have
made comments such as: "Oh, it's you again;" "How long are you
going to stay away this time;" or "You want to go back and get beat
up again?" 0 Others have gone so far as to threaten
victims with
71
sanctions for repeated use of the court system.
Judges also may misinterpret victim behavior that is symptomatic of the psychological trauma induced by extended abuse.
Survivors of prolonged or severe domestic violence often exhibit
some symptoms or meet the full diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 72 This disorder can result in a
courtroom presentation that is substantially different from the
behavior and demeanor that a judge encounters in his normal
experience; these differences may be misinterpreted as indications
of a lack of credibility.73
These complexities can lead judges to identify with the batterer,
distance themselves from the victim,7' and apply artificially
heightened standards of proof.75 A judge may refuse to issue civil
69. The following discussion ofjudicial attitudes is based in large part on the findings of
gender bias task force reports published during the period from the late 1980s to the mid1990s. These reports typically discuss incidents and behavior patterns observed during the
preceding five to ten years. It is possible that some improvements have occurred since the
reports were issued. In my own experience in litigating cases and training judges, however,
such reactions remain common.
70. MARYLAND SPEC. J. COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE CTS., REPORT ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, 7-8 (1989) [hereinafter MARYLAND GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORT].

71. Id. at 8. A particularly egregious example occurred in North Dakota, where a judge
is reported to have told a domestic violence petitioner, "Ifyou go back [to the perpetrator] one
more time, I'll hit you myself." N.D. COMM'N ON GENDER FAIRNESS, A DIFFERENCE IN
PERCEPTIONS: THE FINALREPoRT ONTHENORTH DAKOTA COMMISSION ON GENDERFAIRNESS

IN THE COURTS, reprintedin 72 N.D. L. REv. 1113, 1208 (1996).
72. Epstein, supranote 2, at 40.
73. For a detailed discussion of PTSD symptoms and their impact on judges see id. at 4043.
74. Hanna, supra note 56, at 1878.
75. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Ordersof Protectionin Domestic Violence Cases: An
EmpiricalAssessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 199205 (1993).
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protection orders when documentary or other physical evidence is
absent; 6 when unbiased eyewitnesses are not available; v" when
the only witnesses are the parties and, therefore, a credibility
determination is required;7 1 or when the victim has failed to follow
through with a protection order case on a prior occasion.79 These
kinds of standards have no basis in law and are not applied in other
family law cases.
In 1994, in an effort to address these and other concerns, the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges convened an
expert advisory committee to draft the Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence.80 The purpose of the Code is to "help protect
victims in a fair, prompt and comprehensive fashion. It will help
prevent future violence in every family where such violence has
been discovered.""
But in pursuit of this goal, the Model Code recommends numerous modifications of existing state protection order legislation,
some of which would substantially reduce the process accorded to
batterers. Its drafters urge states to adopt its provisions;8 2 and
76. See id. at 200-01; see also CONN. TASK FORCE ON GENDER, JUSTICE & THE CTS.,

REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 103-04 (1991) (reporting that half of Connecticut judges
require evidence of physical injury before issuing a protection order and describing an
incident in which a judge observed the petitioner's injuries, told her he had received worse
bruises playing golf, and denied her petition); MARYLAND GENDER BIAS TASKFORCE REPORT,
supra note 70, at 4 (reporting an instance in which judge told petitioner to "go back and get
beaten up and have bruises" to qualify for court protection). The Minnesota Supreme Court
Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts reported an incident in which a judge told a
petitioner to "provoke a more serious incident in order to make sure her case was strong
enough to support" a protection order. MINN. SUP. CT. TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN

THECS., FNALREPORT(1989), reprintedin 15 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 825,875 (1989). When
the petitioner said, "I guess I need a knife in my back or at least to be bleeding profusely
from the head and shoulders to get [a protection order]," the judge responded, "That's just
about it."
77. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 75, at 201-02.
78. Id. at 202.
79. Id.
80. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAM. VIOLENCE (Nat'l Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct.

Judges 1994) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The Introduction to the Model Code states that the
Committee was comprised of leaders in the domestic violence field, including judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, matrimonial lawyers, battered women's advocates, medical
and health care professionals, law enforcement personnel, legislators, educators, and others.
Id. at v.
81. Id. at vi.
82. Id.
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although some of its proposals have had a primarily symbolic
impact, several jurisdictions have enacted some Code-inspired
legislation and others are considering doing the same. 3 Two major
Code provisions are discussed below: first, the authorization of
short-term, emergency protection orders issued on the basis of
second-hand, unsworn telephonic accounts provided by police
officers; second, permanent protection orders, of indefinite duration,
issued in the absence of either prior notice to the perpetrator or an
ex ante opportunity to be heard.
1. Emergency ProtectionOrdersIssued Solely on the Basis of
Police Statements
In an effort to maximize victim safety in the immediate
aftermath of a violent incident, the Model Code gives a judge
authority to grant a seventy-two hour, ex parte emergency protection order on the basis of a law enforcement officer's statements,
given over the telephone or in person." The judge must determine
that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the victim is
in immediate danger based on a recent incident of violence or
threats.85 That assessment may be based on an officer's unsworn
comments made out of the judge's presence, so there is no
opportunity for the court to assess the officer's demeanor and
degree of credibility.8 6 Nor is there an opportunity for the judge to
make any assessment about the petitioner's credibility; she is not
required to testify, either in person or on the telephone.8 7 The
resulting order may direct the accused perpetrator to temporarily
do any of the following: stay away from and not contact the
petitioner; vacate the petitioner's residence, even if the accused
is the sole owner of the property; give the petitioner possession
and use of an automobile-again, regardless of ownership; and

83. For example, the author sits on the District of Columbia Domestic Violence
Coordinating Council's Legislation Subcommittee, which has conducted an extensive review
of the Model Code to assesswhether to propose an adapted version for enactment by the D.C.
City Council.
84. MODEL CODE §§ 305(1), (5).
85. Id. §§ 305(1), 102(1).
86. See id. § 305(1).
87. Id.
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surrender custody of any minor children to the petitioner.88
90
9
Provisions similar to these have been enacted in Alaska, Arizona,
California,9 1 Massachusetts,9 2 and Virginia.
2. PermanentEx ParteProtection Orders
Traditionally, courts have authority to issue long-term injunctions only after a trial or documented defense default. The
Model Code, however, sacrifices these procedural conventions in
deference to victim safety. Pursuant to the Code, "[i]f it appears
from a petition" that domestic violence has occurred, a judge may,
"[without notice or hearing, immediately issue an order for
protection" on an ex parte basis.9 4 Not only would the respondent be
denied an opportunity to state his case, but the petitioner could rely
on the strength of her written pleading and would not need to
convince the judge of her credibility in person.
In addition, the Model Code would further alter the laws of most
states by making protection orders permanent. Where in most
jurisdictions protection orders may last from one to three years,95
pursuant to the Code a protection order is effective indefinitely,
or "until further order of the court."9" A protection order issued
pursuant to this system of reduced procedural guarantees also
could contain fairly comprehensive relief. For example, such an
order may direct a perpetrator to vacate a shared residence, turn
over possession of an automobile, lose custody of his children, and
anything additional that a judge "deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner."97 Although the Model Code
88. Id. § 305(3)(a)-(f).
89. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110 (Michie 2000).
90. ARIZ.REv. STAT. §§ 13-3624(C)-(E) (2000) (such anorder maylast onlyuntil following
business day).
91. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6250,6256 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) (such an order may last only

seven calendar days or five business days, whichever is less).
92. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 4, 5 (West 1998) (such an order may last up to
ten business days).
93. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-253.4(B), (C) (Michie Supp. 2001). The law enforcement
officer's assertions must be made under oath. Id. § 16.1-253.4(B).
94. MODEL CODE § 306(1)(a).
95. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
96. MODEL CODE § 306(5).
97. Id. § 305(3).
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does provide an ex post avenue through which a defendant may
access traditional procedural guarantees, 98 such a safeguard pales
in comparison to a hearing scheduled prior to the issuance of an
order.
In sum, the impressive reforms proposed and executed in the
criminal and civil justice systems have dramatically increased
the state's responsiveness to victims of domestic violence. But, as
argued in Part II, these changes have carried with them a substantial downward shift in the degree of process offered to batterers
during arrest, charging, and civil or criminal trials.

II. MANDATED INTERVENTIoNS AND EXPANDED JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY: CAUSE FOR CONCERN

As discussed above, the battered women's movement has
substantially improved the state's responsiveness to victims of
domestic violence. Warrantless arrests and mandatory criminal
justice interventions have resulted in increased application of
criminal sanctions. Civil protection order statutes provide injunctive relief tailored to survivors' safety and family law needs. And
the proposed Model Code certainly would facilitate victims' ability
to obtain protection orders. But all of this progress has come with
serious costs, both in the criminal and civil justice systems.
A Mandatory Criminal Justice Interventions
In the criminal justice system, mandatory policies represent an
important symbolic shift; a declaration that the state no longer
condones violence against women.99 Such policies force officials to
take domestic violence seriously and protect victims, something
they had failed to do for centuries. In addition, supporters argue
that mandatory arrest is the most effective way to protect women
98. If, within thirty days after the protection order is served, either party requests a
hearing, the court must hold one. Id. § 307(1). In addition, the court must hold a hearing
subsequent to the order taking effect, if the order contains relief in the form of an award of
custody, a directive that respondent not contact petitioner, or a directive that respondent
vacate petitioner's residence. Id. § 307(2).
99. Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, IrreconcilableDifferences: Battered Women,
Police, and the Law, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT, supranote 50, at 96, 98; Ford
& Regoli, supra note 50, at 128.
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from recidivist violence,' 0 and no-drop prosecution is the most
effective way to eliminate a perpetrator's ability to escape punishment by threatening victims into dropping charges.' 0 '
Those who support criminal justice mandates further believe that
they will have a general deterrent effect. In the words of activist
Lisa Lerman:
Even if a law enforcement approach fails to result in specific
deterrence in some cases, enforcement of the law ... sends an
appropriate message to the community-that domestic violence
is not acceptable. Specific deterrence of a particular offender is
not the only goal. When an arrest is made ... other men and
women in the community may judge their own situations and
conduct differently .... 2
Mandatory arrest and prosecution also operate as tools for
victim empowerment. Eliminating police and prosecutorial discretion relieves the victim of responsibility for decisions to arrest and
bring charges. Such relief is described as particularly important
because it occurs at a time when the victim may be too afraid of the
perpetrator's physical or psychological retaliation to make an
appropriate decision." 3
Advocates of no-drop prosecution argue that early data indicate
that such policies yield substantial positive results. In San Diego,
for example, officials found that under a traditional policy, levels of
violence increased when abusers learned that a case would be
dismissed if the victim refused to cooperate.0 4 In 1985, the city

100. E.g., Evan Stark, MandatoryArrest ofBatterers:AReply toIts Critics,in DO ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supranote 54, at 115, 128-29. This argument stands on
shaky ground, given the conflicting results of various arrest experiments in the field. See
infra text accompanying note 114.
101. Hanna, supranote 56, at 1864-65,1892.Butsee Gena L. Durham, Note, The Domestic
Violence Dilemma:How OurIneffective and VariedResponses Reflect Our Conflicted Views
of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 650-54 (1998) (arguing that no-drop jurisdictions that
compel victims to testify deter victims from pressing charges and validate jurors' biases
against them).
102. Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 224-25 (1992); see also Hanna, supra note 56, at 1864-65.
103. Sarah Mausolff Buel, MandatoryArrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 211, 222-23 (1988); Hanna, supra note 56, at 1865.
104. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 57, at 310.
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implemented a no-drop policy. Domestic homicides fell from thirty
in 1985 to twenty in 1990, and to seven in 1994.105
A growing number of critics, however, have identified problems
with the invocation of an increasingly potent state response to
intimate abuse. By failing to honor a victim's individual preferences, mandatory policies patronize her and may undermine her
efforts to exert control over her life by disrupting her intimate
relationship, economic security, and family stability.1"' These
reforms also are particularly problematic for many victim sub10 8
01 7
groups, in particular racial minorities,' immigrant populations,
and those of lower socio-economic status.' 9 As Kimberlk Crenshaw
explains:
Women of color are often reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy
likely due to a general unwillingness among people of color to
subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police
force that is frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized
community ethic against public intervention, the product of a
desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults on
the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is not
simply a man's castle in the patriarchal sense; but may also
function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist
society." 0
Women in immigrant communities face laws that make a
batterer deportable if he is convicted of a domestic violence offense,
stalking, or a protection order violation, even if he has previously
105. Mark Hansen, New Strategy in BatteringCases, A.B. J., Aug. 1995, at 14.
106. E.g., Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 28, at 349-50; Epstein, supra note 2, at 17-18;
Durham, supra note 101, at 653-54.
107. E.g., INST. ONVIOLENCE, INc.,VIOLENCEINTHELIVESOFAFRICANAMERICANWOMEN:

A Focus GROUP STUDY 18-19 (Beth E. Richie ed., 1996); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins:Intersectionality,Identity Politics,and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241,1257 (1991); Miriam H. RuttenbergA FeministCritique ofMandatoryArrest:
An Analysis ofRace and Genderin Domestic Violence.Policy, 2 A. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY
& L. 171 (1994).
108. SeegenerallyTien-LiLoke,Note, TrappedinDomesticViolence: The Impact ofUnited
States ImmigrationLaws on BatteredImmigrant Women, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 589 (1997).
109. Susan L. Miller, Unintended Side Effects of Pro-ArrestPoliciesand Their Race and
Class Implicationsfor Battered Women: A CautionaryNote, 3 CRIM. JUST. POLY REV. 299
(1989).
110. Crenshaw, supranote 107, at 1257.
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obtained lawful permanent resident status."' Many victims are
reluctant to expose their partners to the risk of deportation and
further fear being ostracized from their communities for doing so,
particularly if the perpetrator might be subjected to political
persecution if forced to return to his home country." 2
Mandatory responses also may place victims in danger. As
researcher David Regoli puts it, "Notwithstanding 'enormous
reforms in policies and attitudes that reflect a growing consensus
on how best to handle family violence,' we know little with certainty
about what best protects victims.""' The effectiveness of arrest, for
example, is far from clear. Several replication studies cast serious
doubt on the results of the original MinneapolisDomestic Violence
Experiment, and one of its original authors currently supports the
repeal of mandatory arrest laws."' These studies, known as the
Spousal Assault Replication Project (SARP), produced mixed
results, with findings ranging from arrest having no effect, to
having a deterrent effect, to having an escalation effect."' Further
111. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)).
112. Loke, supra note 108, at 591-92.
113. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 149 (quoting Lucy N. Friedman & Minna Shulman,
Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS,
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 87, 90 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990)).
114. Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?,
in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 54, at 43, 50-52.
115. Richard A. Berk et al., The Differential Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Incidents of
Domestic Violence: A BayesianAnalysis of Four FieldExperiments, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 698
(1992) (arguing that arrest has different effects on subsequent violence depending on the
offender's background); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in
Conformity: Legal and ExtralegalControlofDomestic Violence, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 680 (1992)
(arguing that arrest increased recidivism among certain groups and had no overall crime
reduction effect). For a useful debate about how these results should be interpreted see
Richard A. Berk, What the Scientific Evidence Shows: On the Average, We CanDo No Better
Than Arrest, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 330-32;
Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?:Analysis and Policy Implications of New
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994).
The replication experiments were conducted in Colorado Springs, Omaha, Charlotte,
Miami, Milwaukee, and Atlanta. Richard A. Berk et al.,A BayesianAnalysis of the Colorado
Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992); Franklyn W.
Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28
CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990); J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III, FemaleSpouse Abuse
and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1992); Antony M. Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal
Deterrentsto Domestic Violence: The DadeCounty Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM. SOC.
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data suggest that although arrest may reduce recidivist violence in
the short term, it may increase it in the long term." And virtually
no scientific data exist from which to assess whether arrest has a
general, as opposed to specific, deterrent effect.117
A similarly mixed picture exists on the no-drop prosecution front.
One study showed that twenty-five percent of men arrested
pursuant to a victim complaint committed repeat violence against
their partner even before the criminal case was resolved in court;"'
another showed a twenty-two percent reassault rate within three
months of arrest." 9 The only study to directly compare "no-drop"
and "drop permitted" policies found that recidivist violence was
least likely in cases where women were permitted to drop but chose
not to do so. 20 Those victims who did exercise their option to drop
the case, however, were subjected to 2higher levels of violence than
were those in the no-drop condition.' '
Mandatory prosecution also may harm some battered women by
depriving them of a powerful negotiation tool. One study showed
that some victims are able to strike a bargain with the perpetrator;
she will drop the charges if he will stay away
from her, pay child
2
support, or give her custody of the children.12
REV. 691 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The VariableEffects ofArrest on Criminal
Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137
(1992). The sixth National Institute of Justice funded study took place in Atlanta, Georgia;
no results have been published. For an insightful analysis of the myriad weaknesses of the
Minneapolis Experiment as a basis for national police policy, see Arnold Binder & James W.
Meeker, ExperimentsAs Reforms, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. 347 (1988).
116. Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 114, at 49; see also J. David Hirschel et al., The
Failureof Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7 (1992) (stating that
arrest is no more effective than short-term separation of the parties, or issuance of a citation
to the perpetrator).
117. Berk, What the Scientific Evidence Shows, supra note 115, at 324.
118. David A. Ford,PreventingandProvoking Wife Battery throughCriminalSanctioning:
A Look atthe Risks, in ABUSEDAND BATrERED 191,198 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller
eds., 1991).
119. Lisa A. Goodman et al., PredictingRepeat Abuse Among Arrested Batterers: Use of
the DangerAssessmentScale in the CriminalJusticeSystem, 15 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 63,
69-70 (2000).
120. Ford & Regoli, supra note 50, at 156.
121. Id.
122. David A. Ford, Wife Battery and Criminal Justice:A Study of Victim DecisionMaking, 32 FAM. REL. 463, 469 (1983). Othdr researchers have studied the impact of
coordinated community interventions on recidivism of abusers. For example, one study found
that the combined effects of prosecution, probation, and court-ordered counseling were
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But there is yet another danger for battered women arising from
these mandates that has gone virtually unnoticed in the advocacy
community. As these reforms were enacted and enforced, offenders
suddenly were held accountable for behavior that long had been
routinely ignored. The perpetrator population reacted with disbelief, quickly followed by claims of unfair, discriminatory treatment.1 2 During arrests, pretrial settlement conferences, and trials,
perpetrators and their counsel frequently voiced their belief that
the new system had created an anti-male, pro-victim bias, as well
as a deprivation of their civil liberties. 24 This perception, accurate
or not, may be harmful to victims.
Defendants in civil protection order and criminal cases frequently
complain that the "system is against men," and that in responding
to a "family matter," the police "always arrest the man" and "judges
always believe the woman. " "2Perpetrators who agree to settle civil
protection order cases often angrily exclaim that "no one believes
the man in these cases anyway." Once an order is entered by the
judge, many of these same men barely wait to exit the courtroom
doors before crumpling their copy into a ball and slamming it into
the nearest trash can, grumbling, "It's just a piece of paper, it's not
going to change anything." At conferences and training sessions,
defense attorneys frequently echo these sentiments.2 6 Given states'
associated with a significant reduction in recidivism. Christopher M. Murphy et al.,
CoordinatedCommunity InterventionforDmesticAbusers:InterventionSystem Involvement
and CriminalRecidivism, 13 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 263, 278 (1998).
123. This observation is based on numerous interviews with police officers, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys conducted after the enactment of a mandatory arrest law and the
implementation of a no-drop prosecution policy in Washington, D.C.
124. These observations are based on my personal experience, both before and after
implementation of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, negotiating and litigating
hundreds of domestic violence cases, observing many more civil and criminal cases, and
directing D.C.'s Emergency Domestic Relations Project, which until November 1996 was
responsible for handling all pretrial protection order cases for pro se victims in the District
of Columbia.
125. Id.
126. E.g., Sam Skonik, DomesticBreakdown, LEGALTIMS, June 17,1996, at 14 (quoting
Colin Dunham, President, D.C. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association). This perspective
is occasionally voiced in the media as well. Cathy Young, Domestic Violations, 29 REASON 24
(1998); Robyn E. Blumner, DomesticAbuse Law TreatsMen Unfairly,ST. PE=RSBURGTIMES
(Fla.), Dec. 5, 1999, at id; Kathleen Parker, Fathers'ProtestsDeserveAiring, USA TODAY,
Nov. 4, 1999, at 19A; Andrew P. McGuire, Esq., Remarks at the D.C. Bar Association
Conference: The New Rules Governing Proceedings in the D.C. Domestic Violence Unit (Mar.
21, 2001); Jonathan Rapping, D.C. Public Defender Service Domestic Violence Coordinator,
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long history of discriminatory refusal to assist victims of family

abuse, 1 7 however, it is difficult to believe that these new policies
could have an impact so fundamental as to not only level the
playing field, but to regrade it in the opposite direction.
But whether unfair treatment of batterers occurs, or is simply
perceived to occur, the issue must be taken seriously. Although
many victim advocates and tough-on-crime policymakers are
perfectly comfortable with-or at least not particularly troubled
by-the idea of an antidefense bias, this possibility should be of
equal concern to victims as it is to perpetrators. As discussed infra,
recent social science data demonstrate that even unrealistic
perceptions of unfair treatment undermine subsequent compliance
with the law. Given the likelihood that a victim will resume some
form of contact with her abusive partner in the aftermath of official
intervention,' factors affecting future compliance assume major
significance for victim safety.
B. Expanded JudicialAuthority in Awarding Civil Protection
Orders
A similar set of concerns arises on examination of recent reform
proposals in the civil protection order system. Although the Model
Code proposals address real problems and would certainly improve
victims' access to justice, they are accompanied by a dramatic
erosion of traditional due process guarantees for defendants.
The measures proposed in the Model Code are designed, in
129
part, to maximize victims' ability to obtain protection orders.
Studies have shown that many battered women come to court for a
Remarks at the D.C. Criminal and Appellate Practice Institute (Nov. 20, 1999).
Attorneys who represent accused perpetrators also see mandatory arrest as a serious
threat to their clients' civil liberties. MandatoryArrest Policiesin Domestic Violence Cases:
Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,103d Cong. (1994) (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union), available
at http:/www.aclu.org/congress/lg071494z.html.
127. See supranotes 19-21 and accompanying text.
128. Kristin Littel et al, Assessing JusticeSystem Response to Violence Against Women:
A Tool for Law Enforcement, Prosecution and the Courts to Use in Developing Effective
Responses (1998) (information provided in section regardingthe response of law enforcement
to violence against women), availableat http'/www.vaw.umn.edu/Promise/pplaw.htm.
129. MODEL CODE § 306 cmt.
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temporary, ex parte protection order, but then never return to
obtain longer-term protection. 13 0 Judicial bias, frustration, and the
tendency to discredit victims, 131 as well as fear of batterer reprisals,
create serious obstacles to victims' ability to safely and productively
access the civil justice system. Petitioners in civil protection order
cases are frequently frustrated when the police are unable to offer
them immediate protection at the scene of an abusive incident, and
they routinely express surprise and dismay when they learn that
they must notify their abusive partner2 about the civil protection
13
order suit and testify in his presence.
The Model Code's emergency process certainly goes a long way
toward ensuring a victim's access to legal protection until she
realistically can have time to appear before a judge and provide a
more formal presentation of her case. At the same time, this process
may well feel unfair to an accused batterer. It is unlikely that a
person under arrest will perceive as fair and unbiased a finder of
fact who relies exclusively on a police officer's version of events, and
who provides the accused with no opportunity to present his own
story. The police, perhaps more than any other government actors,
are not viewed as neutral arbiters by
either those in the criminal
133
justice system or the general public.
Similarly, the Model Code's ex post procedural safeguards pale
in comparison to a hearing that occurs priorto the issuance of an
order. Few respondents in any jurisdiction are represented by
counsel in civil protection order cases, 134 so they are unlikely to be
130. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND

LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DoMESTIC VIOLENCE 47 (Susan L. Keilitz et al. eds., 1997)
(battered women obtained a temporary protection order but did not return for a permanent
order in forty-four percent of District of Columbia cases studied, sixty-one percent of Denver
cases studied, and seventy-five percent of Delaware cases studied); Adele Harrell & Barbara
Smith, Effects of RestrainingOrders on Domestic Violence Victims, in THE URBAN INST.,
LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILYVIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

49, 50 (1998).
131. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
132. Even when police conscientiously adhere to mandatory arrest policies, they are of
little use when the batterer flees the scene before the arrival of law enforcement.
133. FRANKJ.VANDALL, POLICE TRAINING FORTOUGH CALLS: DISCRETIONARY SITUATIONS
1 & nn.4-6, 2 & n.29 (1976).
134. District of Columbia study found that approximately seventy percent of petitioners
and respondents are unrepresented in civil protection order cases. D.C. COURTS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS

IN THE CouRTS 143 (1992). In general, up to ninety percent of defendants in civil courts
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advised of their right to request a hearing in the month following
the receipt of what, on its face, appears to be a final court order.
Even in those instances where a hearingis scheduled and held, this
only provides the respondent with an opportunity to undo the order
long after it has gone into effect. He is likely to spend at least thirty
days, and most likely far longer, ordered out of his home, forced to
stay away from a range of persons and places, with no access to his
children, and without the use of his car. 1" 5
The Code's authors justify their proposals by explaining that:
"there is evidence that the safety, if not the lives, of victims would
be jeopardized if they were required to give notice and participate
in a full hearing before any legal protection is issued."" 6 This may
be true, 3 ' but these suggested reforms also most certainly deprive
respondents of their traditional due process rights.
Movement activists, policymakers, and scholars have debated the
relative merits of criminal and civil justice system reforms almost
exclusively in terms of expanding victims' access to justice and
increasing perpetrators' accountability. Little or no concern has
been expressed about the accompanying reduction in procedural
protections for perpetrators. Even more significantly, virtually no
attention has been paid to the data demonstrating a close
connection between batterers' sense of unfair treatment and victim

safety.
Of course, providing defendants with due process is a concept
firmly rooted in the U.S. Constitution.3l 8 Ensuring that an accused
person is treated with fairness, respect, and neutrality enhances
dealing with issues such as landlord-tenant cases are not represented by counsel. Russell
Engler, Out of Sight and Out ofLine: The Needfor Regulation of Lawyers'Negotiationswith
UnrepresentedPoorPersons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 79, 107 (1997).
135. This proposal represents a dramatic deviation fromtraditional notions ofdue process.
I am aware ofno area of civil litigation in which a party's right to be heard arises only after
an order is issued.
136. MODEL CODE § 306 cmt.
137. This claim, however, seems exaggerated. Presumably, a judge could issue a shortterm, two- to three-week ex parte order that would extend from the time of filing the claim
to the time of a contested trial. This would provide the petitioner with the same protection
as a permanent order, but also would ensure an opportunity for a traditional hearing with
routine procedural guarantees. Indeed, this is the process in place in numerous jurisdictions.
E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(d) (2000) (two-week temporary order available on ex parte
basis).
138. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
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the morality and decency of our justice system. But if such
treatment has the additional benefit of increasing compliance
with the law, it is of particular importance in domestic violence
cases. For victims of intimate partner abuse, recidivist violence,
increasing both in frequency and severity, is a highly predictable
fact of life.139 To effectively break this cycle of violence, the justice
system is forced to ensure compliance with its directives. The
research demonstrating the impact of procedural justice on future
compliance is explored in the following section.

III. THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE DEPRIVATIONS:
RETHINKING STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO PROTECTING BATTERED
WOMEN
Over the past thirty years, activists in the battered women's
movement have focused on improving the justice system's response
to domestic violence and encouraging victims to seek help from
police, prosecutors, and judges. These responses, however, can only
be effective if batterers actually comply with police directives, with
judicial orders setting conditions for pretrial release, sentencing,
probation, and parole, and with court-issued civil protection orders.
If government power is expanded in a way that instills a sense of
unfair treatment among perpetrators, it will undermine the
likelihood of such compliance, and victims of abuse will have gained
little.
Recent social science research has shed new light on the factors
that influence individual compliance with the dictates of government authorities. This research represents a significant break with
traditional criminological theory about why people obey the law.
Much of the existing research on the effectiveness of justice
system intervention is rooted in deterrence theory. This theory rests
on the instrumental view that compliance with the law is primarily
determined by self-interest. Simply put, a person obeys the law
when the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs.'40 The preoccupation of legal scholars with deterrence theory has led to a

139. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATWERED WOMEN KILL 68-69 (1987); LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATrERED WOMAN 43-44 (1979).
140. E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (1990).
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research emphasis on comparing the degree of social control
imposed through different outcomes of legal proceedings. The
expectation is that as a negative outcome, or sanction, increases in
severity or certainty, so does its effectiveness in inhibiting future
illegal behavior. In essence, "what people care about when they
have contact with legal authorities is securing a favorable outcome
for themselves."14 1
But research in the field of social psychology now casts doubt on
this theory. A growing body of data indicates that compliance with
official directives depends as much on the manner in which an
outcome is reached as the ultimate outcome itself.1 42 Because
deterrence theoryhas become so culturally ingrained, this idea may
seem counterintuitive. Why would a person be more likely to comply
with an order that he believes is decided wrongly, simply because
the process that led to it appears fair?
Some researchers have posited that fair procedures foster
compliance because of a link to traditional deterrence theory. Fair
outcomes; the favorable outcomes, in turn,
procedures promote fair
43
compliance.
increase
The data, however, support an alternative concept: fair treatment
affects compliance regardless of whether the ultimate result is
viewed as right or wrong. If people feel unfairly treated by a
government official or a court proceeding, they will perceive the
source as less legitimate and, as a consequence, obey its orders less
frequently. 4 4 As researcher Tom Tyler explains:
141. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do FairProceduresMatter? The Effect of Procedural
Justiceon Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'y REV. 163, 167 (1997).
142. TYLER, supranote 140.
143. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS (1975); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory ofProcedure,66 CAL. L. REV.
541 (1978).
144. TYLER, supranote 140, at 108; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A RelationalModel of
Authority in Groups,25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992). In Tyler's
words:
[P]rocedure reflects the diverse values of distributive justice found in such a
pluralistic society as the United States. Because there is no single, commonly
accepted set of moral values against which to judge the fairness of outcomes or
policies, such evaluations are difficult to make. People can however agree on
the fairness of procedures for decision making. [Individuals'] [e]valuations of

authorities, institutions, and policies therefore focus on the procedures bywhich
they function, rather than on evaluations of their decisions or policies. If the
consensus that binds together society is in fact a procedural consensus, then
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[P]eople want to be treated fairly by authorities independent of
any effect on favorable outcomes. [A]dhering to fair procedures
will cement persons' ties to the social order because it treats
them with dignity and worth and certifies their full and valued
membership in the group. [B]eing treated fairly by authorities,
even while being sanctioned by them, influences both a person's
view of the legitimacy of group authority and ultimately that
person's obedience to group norms. 45
Accordingly, the procedural justice theory holds that allowing a
person to state his case, taking his opinions seriously, communicating that officials maintain an open mind about him and his
case, and treating him with respect, all enhance his perceptions
that authorities are moral and legitimate. Compliance, even if it is
counter to one's immediate self-interest, then stems from a sense of
duty or morality.
Researchers have identified several building blocks of procedural
justice. The first is trust: To what extent does a defendant
perceive that he has had a genuine opportunity to state his case
146
and that his needs are being treated as a matter of concern?
This factor is referred to in the literature as "process control," 47 or
authorities need to be especially concerned with maintainingfairprocedures for
making allocations and resolving disputes.
TYLER, supranote 140, at 109 (citations omitted).
145. TYLER, supranote 140, at 165.
146. TYLER, supranote 140, at 136-38, 163. The importance of this concept has long been
recognized by authorities. An Egyptian judge's manual written around 2300-2150 B.C.
advises:
If you are a man who leads

Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads;
Don't stop him from purging his body
Of that which he planned to tell.
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart

More than that his case be won.
About him who stops a plea

One asks "Why does he reject it?"
Not all one pleads for can be granted,
But a good hearing soothes the heart.
Id. at 148 (quoting Ptahhotep, The Instruction ofPtahhotep (Egypt 2300-2150 B.C.), quoted
in JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE at vii (1985)).
147. Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction With Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 72, 72 (1985). "Process
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"voice."' Another building block is neutrality: Is the relevant legal
authority honest, engaged in fact-based decision making, and
functioning in the absence of bias or prejudice? 49 A third element
is consistency: Are authorities treating similarly situated persons
in a similar manner?5 0 Can an individual expect to receive similar
treatment over time, in different encounters with the justice
system?' 5 ' The final element can be expressed as standing, or
dignity: Are authorities 52engaging in respectful and ethical
treatment of individuals?
The procedural justice hypothesis-that fair treatment by
authorities improves compliance with their directives-is supported
by several strands of criminological theory. John Braithwaite's
shaming theory holds that sanctions imposed in a manner that
harms a person's dignity may result in an increase in future
offending.'53 Conversely, sanctions imposed in a respectful manner
that honors human dignity may increase compliance with
authority. 5 4 Robert Agnew's "strain" theory rests on the concept
that fair and respectful treatment by legal authorities, which
entails the opportunity for meaningful participationin the decisionmaking process, may reduce the negative feelings that can result in
strain and rule-breaking. 5 Social control theory posits that bonds
to conventional institutions and individuals curb illegal actions.' 5 6
control," or the opportunity to express one's views about how a decision should be made, is

distinguished from "decision control," or actual influence over the nature of a decision. Id.
148. ALBERTD. HIRSCHmAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,

ORGANiZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
149. Paternoster et aL, supranote 141, at 168.
150.
151.
152.
153.

TYLER, supranote 140, at 118-19, 135.
Id.
Id. at 138-39, 152.
JOHN BRA'rHWA1TE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 98-107 (1989); see also

Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal
Sanction, 30 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993) (articulating similar "defiance" theory
of fair treatment and deterrence). For an introduction to recent debates on the
appropriateness of shaming see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63
U. Cm. L. REV. 591 (1996); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture,and American CriminalLaw,

89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).
154. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 153, at 55.
155. Robert Agnew, Foundationfor a GeneralStrain Theory of Crime and Delinquency,
30 CRIINOLOGY 47 (1992).
156. E.g., TRAVIS HIRSCHi, CAUSES OFDELINQUENCY 10-11 (1969); ROBERTJ. SAMPSON &
JOHNH.LAUB, CIiEINTHEMAKING.PATHWAYSANDTURNINGPOINTSTHROUGHLIFE 139-78

1878

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1843

Perceptions of unfair treatment could weaken one's stake in
conformity; fair treatment could strengthen it.
In addition to this theoretical grounding, extensive data, obtained
in a wide variety of contexts, supports one essential component of
the procedural justice theory. A strong link exists between one's
perceptions of fair treatment and one's attitude toward authority.
Perceptions of fairness affect both one's degree of satisfaction with
the ultimate outcome of a legal proceeding and one's sense of the
overall legitimacy of governmental authority.
Particular attention has been paid to the importance ofproviding
a litigant with the opportunity to state his case. l" 7 The data indicate
that the simple opportunity to express oneself has value and
impact-regardless of any influence on decisional outcomes.' 5 8 One
study demonstrated that even when litigants were permitted to
speak only after a decision was made (without any possible
influence on outcome), this opportunity
increased perceptions that
159
one.
fair
a
was
decision
ante
ex
the
Other aspects of fair treatment also affect citizens' satisfaction
with their justice system encounters. In an extensive study of
interactions with the police and courts, people reported viewing
their experience more favorably, and viewing police and court
officials as more legitimate, when they were permitted to present
their case, perceived that authority figures were attempting to be
fair, and believed authority figures were treating them with
(1993); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past to Future
Participationin Delinquency, 29 CRIINOLOGY 163 (1991).
157. Thibaut and Walker call this "process control;" Hirschman and Folger call it "giving
voice." HIRSCHMAN, supra note 148; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 143; Robert Folger,
Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of 'Voice" and Improvement on
Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 108 (1977); see also Tom R. Tyler,
The Psychological Consequencesof JudicialProcedures:Implicationsfor Civil Commitment
Hearings, in LAW INA THERAPEUTIC KEY 3, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996) (discussing the value in presenting arguments to a third party).
158. Tyler et al., supranote 147, at 79 (explaining that perceived control over opportunity
to speak heightened judgments of procedural justice regardless of perceived control over
decisional outcome).
159. E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and
NoninstrumentalConcernsin FairnessJudgments, 59J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 952,
952-53 (1990). Another study found that the amount oftime spentwith an attorney (and thus
the degree of voice in the process) was positively related to felony defendants' reports of
procedural fairness. Jonathan D. Casper et al., ProceduralJustice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 483,498 (1988).
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respect.16 In another study, the way police officers treated a person
during an arrest-whether they acted in a businesslike manner,
tried to be helpful, used disrespectful language, pushed the person
around unnecessarily, or embarrassed him in front of othersaffected felony defendants' sense of procedural fairness. The quality
of police treatment also had a spillover effect onto defendant
evaluations of their experience with courtroom personnel and their
general sense of fair treatment by the government.16
These findings are equally applicable to the civil justice system.
A survey of parties involved in mediated and litigated custody
disputes revealed that, overall, perceived procedural justice had an
equally strong impact on outcome satisfaction as did a favorable
substantive resolution. 2 And for those in "high conflict" parenting
relationships, 163 procedural fairness was more important than
outcome in determining outcome satisfaction. 1 Similarly, fair
process led to outcome satisfaction
in two studies of litigants in
1 65
federal civil arbitration programs.
Several studies also have shown that procedural fairness can
have an impact that is not only independent of, but greater than,
case outcome. For example, a study of defendants in misdemeanor
and traffic courts found that perceptions ofjudicial fairness directly
influenced participants' self-reported support for the legitimacy of
the individual judge, the particular case result, and the court
system in general. 166 The actual case outcome-guilty or not
160. TYLER, supranote 140, at 85-93.
161. Casper et al., supranote 159, at 498,506. Voice matters to victims, as well. Women's
satisfaction with police response to domestic violence incidents is highest when the officers
comply with the woman's preference, whether that is to arrest, or to refrain from arresting,

the perpetrator. Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's
Assessment of the CriminalProcessingSystem's Responses, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 251
(1998).
162. Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents'
Satisfactionin a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
553, 558-59 (1993).
163. Parents were asked to rate the degree of conflict they experience in twenty-five
potential problem areas, such as visitation, gifts, and discipline, on a scale of one to four. Id.
at 558.
164. Id. at 559-60.
165. E. Allan Lind et al, Individualand CorporateDispute Resolution:Using Procedural
Fairnessas a DecisionHeuristic,38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 224 (1993).
166. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of PerceivedInjustice in Defendants'Evaluations of Their
CourtroomExperience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51, 67 (1984) (explaining that perceptions of
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guilty-had far less impact on this sense of support.1 "7 The
empirical evidence further indicates that people generalize from
their sense of procedural fairness in a particular justice system
encounter to broader attitudes about the law, courts, and the
political system. 68
A small but growing body of research has begun to make an
additional, crucial connection: perceptions of procedural justice not
only increase outcome satisfaction and support for the justice
system, but actually may translate into future compliance with
authority. The handful of studies in this area have shown a
compliance effect in criminal, civil, and family law contexts.
A telephone survey of people who previously had contact with
police or courts found that only those who believed they were
treated unfairly subsequently self-reported reduced compliance
with laws prohibiting shoplifting, speeding, drunk driving,
littering, illegal parking, and noise violations.'69 Another study
analyzed factors predictive of long-term compliance with mediated
agreements in civil cases.'1 ° Where respondents believed that the
procedural fairness are linked to defendants' beliefs that a judge takes sufficient time to
carefully consider a dase and that the judge appears unbiased).
167. Id.; see also Kitzmann & Emery, supra note 162, at 558-60.
168. Tom R. Tyler et al., MaintainingAllegiance Toward PoliticalAuthorities:The Role
of PriorAttitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SGi. 629, 629-52 (1989).
Procedural fairness has been shown to have a positive effect on participant satisfaction not
only in formal courtroom settings, but also in the context of alternative dispute resolution.
E.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small ClaimsCourt:Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOCY REV. 11, 36-37 (1984) (demonstrating that
compliance with a mediated resolution of a small claims complaint is more likely where
defendant feels that the procedures were fair).
169. TYLER, supra note 140, at 40-42. A similar survey found that those who reported
hearing stories of unfair treatment by the Internal Revenue Service officials in tax audits
assessed themselves as less likely to comply with tax laws than those who did not report
hearing such stories. KarylA. Kinsey, DeterrenceandAlienationEffectsofIRSEnforcement:
AnAnalysis ofSurvey Data,in WHYPEOPLEPAYTAXES 259,267-82 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
170. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313,
324-28 (1993) (explaining that perceptions ofprocedural fairness were linked to participants'
beliefs that they were given an opportunity to state their case, that the full spectrum of
relevant issues were aired, and that the mediators had listed listened to and made genuine
efforts to understand concerns raised). Complainant reports of improvements in their
personal relationships with respondents also were linked to cases involving perceived
procedural fairness. Id. at 326-27.
Like many others cited in this Article, this study suffers from aweakness common in social
science research. Researchers were unable to locate approximately half of the original
participants to obtain long-term follow-up data. Out of a total of seventy-three cases, forty-six
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mediation process was fair, complainants reported better compliance over the following four to eight months, even in cases where
respondents were dissatisfied with the substance of the agreement. 7 ' A study of litigants in small claims court found that
participants were more likely to comply with both favorable and
judgments when they believed the trial process was
unfavorable
17 2
fair.
This research has particularly important implications for
domestic violence cases. Advocates for battered women frequently
express concern that batterers will not comply with court orders,
particularly in the civil protection context. Many victims report that
their intimate partners have declared that a protection order is
"just a piece of paper" that will not prevent them from continuing
their abusive behavior.'7" Enhancing the likelihood of a batterer's
compliance with police directives and court orders could substantially increase victim safety.
Only one study has tested the procedural justice compliance
theory in the domestic violence context. In that study, researchers
considered the extent to which a batterer's perception of police
officers' procedural fairness at the scene of a reported intimate
partner crime affected recidivism rates. 174 The pre-existing literature on this subject focused exclusively on the impact of different
police-imposed sanctions on recidivism (i.e., warning, mediation,
and arrest); as discussed in Part H.A, supra, the results were
equivocal.
The principal investigators in the original police arrest
experiment concluded that their study "strongly suggest[ed] that
the police should use arrest in most domestic violence cases,"

complainants and thirty-four respondents were reached and agreed to participate in a second
interview. Id. at 317. It is quite conceivable that parties who were not satisfied with the
mediation, or where subsequent compliance was poor, would be disproportionately
represented in the group that was more difficult to contact.
171. Id. at 327. This study's applicability to domestic violence disputes is heightened by
the fact that virtually all of the cases involved disputes arising out of personal relationships
and most of those relationships were severely strained when mediation took place. Id. at 31617.
172. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 168.
173. E.g., JAMES PTACEK, BATIRED WOMEN INTHE COURTROOM: THE POwEROFJUDICIAL

RESPONSES 170 (1999); see also supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
174. Paternoster et al., supra note 141, at 163.
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because arrest was most highly correlated with low recidivism
rates.'75 But when six replication studies were conducted in
different jurisdictions, the findings ranged all over the map; in some
studies arrest had no effect, in others it had a deterrent effect, and
in others it escalated subsequent violence.1 6 Even within the same
jurisdiction, the impact of arrest often varied based on the length
of detention subsequent to arrest, as well as certain offender
characteristics,
such as employment status and other ties to the
77
community.1

What these studies failed to consider, however, was the
possibility that these seemingly inconsistent results could be
explained through the impact of differing police procedures. In
1997, researchers re-examined the data from one of the original
study sites, to determine whether "the manner in which sanctions
are imposed has an independent and more powerful
effect on spouse
78
assault than the sanction outcome itself."
The researchers analyzed a wide range of data reflective of
perceptions of procedural justice. For example, arrestees were
asked whether police officers took the time to listen to their side of
the story (relevant to voice); whether they expected to be arrested
when the police arrived (relevant to consistency); whether the police
listened to both their story and the victim's story (relevant to
neutrality); and whether they were handcuffed and, in particular,
79
whether this occurred in front of the victim (relevant to dignity).
The results of this re-analysis demonstrate that a batterer's
perceptions of fair treatment have a statistically significant effect
on his future recidivism. 80 Arrestees showed lower recidivism rates
175. LAWRENCEW. SHERMAN& RICHARDA. BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
EXPERIMENT 2 (1984).
176. LAWRENCEW. SHERMAN, PouCINGDOMESrICVIOLENCE: EXPERIM NTSAND DIEMMAS
125-53 (1992).

177. Id.
178. Paternoster et al., supranote 141, at 165.
179. Id. at 175-79. Other variables also were considered, including the arrestee's stake in
the community (including whether he was a member of a church or community organization)
and his beliefs about the appropriateness of using physical violence against a partner. Id. at
178. Because this study was based on an after-the-fact analysis, researchers were limited to
procedural justice data points collected in the original study. Id. at 175-79. Further research
that includes a more comprehensive range of data points specifically designed to test
procedural justice hypotheses clearly is needed.
180. Id. at 194. Because this study was a re-analysis of the data collected in the original
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when they perceived that they were treated fairly.1"' Indeed, fair
treatment during arrest had the same recidivism-inhibiting effect
as did a favorable outcome-being warned. When coupled with
perceived unfair treatment, in contrast, arrest had a significantly
reduced effect on future compliance.' 82
Researchers further found that neither an arrestee's stake in
conformity (as measured by marital and employment status), nor
the length of his post-arrest detention were statistically related to
future compliance. 83 Moreover, the "effect of perceived procedural
justice is comparable in magnitude to the various effects of arrest
and stakes in conformity-the two variables which have been the
subject of much research and speculation in the SARP spouse
assault experiments." 184
One other study lends some indirect support to this finding that
the manner in which batterers feel they are treated affects victim
safety in domestic violence cases. Researchers asked perpetrators
to report whether they felt angry ("definitely," "somewhat," or "not
at all") in reaction to their entry into the criminal justice system. 185
Those arrested on the basis of a warrant, who rated themselves as
"definitely" angry, were three times more likely than those who felt
less anger to commit repeat violence against their partner before
the criminal case was resolved in court. 186

Minneapolis Experiment, however, the authors concede that it suffers from manyofthe same
research weaknesses as did that study. Id. For a review of these problems, see Zorza, supra
note 115.
181. Paternoster et al., supranote 141, at 186.
182. Id. at 192.
183. Id. at 191-92. As the authors note, however,
it is entirely possible that our measures ofone's "stake in conformity" (marital
and employment status) are poor proxies for one's commitment to the
community or group. Future research should employ more subjective
assessments of the extent to which individuals feel themselves to be integrated
into and members of the group whose rules are being enforced.
Id. at 192 n.20.
184. Id. at 194.
throughCriminalSanctioning:
185. DavidA. Ford,PreventingandProvokingWifeBattery
A Look at the Risks, in ABUSED AND BATTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY
VIOLENCE 191, 194 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991).
186. Id. at 197. In addition, batterers who strongly protest the entry of a protection order
in the courtroom are three to four times more likely to subsequently violate the order.
Harrell & Smith, supra note 130, at 49,50.
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These studies, in conjunction with the general procedural
justice literature described above, contain an important lesson for
architects of the state's response to domestic violence. Even for
those whose sole concern is victim safety, the impact of reform
policies on batterer compliance must be taken into account.
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

The idea that fair treatment has an independent, substantial
effect on batterers' compliance with authority is a simple but
powerful one. Although the justice system's treatment of victims

has been far worse than its treatment of their abusive partners, the
perceptions and experiences of abusers can no longer be ignored. A
strong possibility exists that many well-intentioned reforms have
undermined victim safety by eroding procedural justice for
perpetrators. In the criminal justice system, police and prosecutors
must provide defendants with expanded opportunities for voice,
while simultaneously improving the advocacy services available to
victims. Defense attorneys must take advantage of their special
position of trust to assist in the effort to promote compliance.
Judges must learn to be more respectful of and attentive to
defendants, particularly when they appear pro se in civil protection
order suits. In the civil system, more and better information must
be provided to accused batterers and pretrial negotiation processes
must be made more responsive to defendants' individual needs.
A. The CriminalJustice System
1. IncreasingPerpetrators'Opportunitiesfor Voice
Many batterers' first encounter with the justice system is the
moment when police respond to the scene of an abusive incident.
Perhaps for that reason, perceptions about an officer's actions leave
a lasting impression and can influence a perpetrator's view of his
entire criminal justice experience. By creating an atmosphere of
receptiveness, respect, and impartiality, law enforcement officers
could greatly enhance batterers' compliance with court directives
designed to protect victims.
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To do so, officers must learn to communicate a willingness to
understand and consider a suspect's version of events. A person is
most likely to feel "heard" when a listener conveys that he is
focused and present in the moment; that he is attending to and
reflecting back what the suspect says without being distracted or
focused on his own agenda.' The listener also needs to make clear
that he has suspended judgment and is open to different versions
of events. 8 Clinical psychologists routinely employ such skills, and
could develop training programs to help police officers develop
similar expertise in interpersonal communication.
Officers also could convey a sense of neutrality and respect by
clearly explaining their actions, refraining from disrespectful or
derogatory language, and avoiding the use of unnecessary physical
force.' 89 Handcuffing suspects should be avoided unless truly
necessary and then should be accomplished as privately as possible,
to avoid humiliating the perpetrator in front of his intimate
partner, family, or community. 90
These recommendations are in no way meant to suggest a return
to police practices of an earlier era. The gains that have been made
in sending a clear message of disapproval to batterers and of
responsiveness and support to victims must be preserved. Police
must not treat perpetrators more preferentially than victims;
equally respectful treatment is not only appropriate to the
situation, it also is the only way to prevent victims from reverting
to a position of discouragement and distrust. In addition, officers
must communicate clearly that intimate partner violence is illegal
and responsibility lies squarely with the perpetrator-but they
must do so while treating an individual suspect with dignity.
On the surface, these reforms might appear to require only minor
adjustments in the investigation and arrest process. But their
implementation presents a serious challenge to the entrenched
187. E.g., CLARA E. HILL & KAREN M. O'BRIEN, HELPING SKILLS: FACILITATING
EXPLORATION, INSIGHT, AND ACTION 81-93, 99-101 (1999).
188. E.g., WILLIAM R. MILLER & STEPHEN ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING:
PREPARING PEOPLE TO CHANGE ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 55-56 (1991).

189. See Casper et al., supranote 159, at 498 (describing research results indicating that
treatment by police affects a defendant's sense offair process); Paternoster et al., supranote
141, at 194 (describing research results suggesting that an individual's perception of
procedural justice reduces his likelihood of recidivism).
190. See supranote 179.
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culture of policing. Officers are trained to employ a style of
"command and control-they try to dominate people and situations
by displays of force or the potential for the use of force." 191 Most
officers see their role as apprehending the perpetrator and adducing
sufficient evidence against him to support a conviction, not creating
an environment in which a suspect feels heard and understood. 2
They are unlikely to view the task of fostering an accused's sense of
fair treatment as part of their job.
The challenge here is lessened, however, by the fact that the
police need not actually feel impartial, they need only appear to be
doing so.193 Because compliance depends solely on enhanced
perceptions of fairness, 9 ' it would be sufficient for officers to make
stylistic changes without actually adopting an impartial approach,
disavowing their adversarial position, or decreasing their legitimate
efforts to investigate a case. Of course, even such surface-level
behavioral reforms may be difficult to implement.
How can police officers be persuaded to create a new culture of
investigation and arrest? Training programs need to emphasize
that, in the long run, these reforms should facilitate the task of law
enforcement, by increasing future compliance with court orders that
require appearance at trial, set conditions of pretrial release and
post-conviction probation, and regulate family law issues through
a protection order. Providing procedural justice reduces "repeat
customers"-every order complied with, rather than violated,
means one fewer arrest to be made and in many cases one fewer
victim re-abused.
One way to reinforce such training messages is to provide law
enforcement officers with feedback on the success of their efforts. In
191. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness:A ProactiveModel of Social Regulation,
81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 364-65 (2001).
192. David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE:
UNDERSTANDINGAND CONTROLLINGPOLICEABUSE OF FORCE 180 (WilliamA Geller&Hans
Toch eds., 1996); StephenD. Mastrofskiet al., ComplianceonDemand:ThePublic'sResponse
to Specific PoliceRequests, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 269,274 (1996); Robert Sgambelluri,

PoliceCulture,PoliceTraining,andPoliceAdministration:TheirImpacton Violence inPolice
Families,in FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS

309, 314 (Donald D. Sheehan ed., 2000).
193. Tyler & Lind, supranote 144, at 162. Of course, both form and substance must cohere
if any claim of system integrity is to be made.
194. Id.
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the Manhattan Community Court, the prosecutor's office records
convictions in a police-accessible database.'9 5 Officers-who previously had no routine access to such information-report that they
are encouraged to make arrests when they see that their work
results in a successful prosecution.' 9 An analogous system should
be implemented here: as officers learn that suspects they arrested
have successfully completed probation, or complied with the terms
of a civil protection order, they may become convinced that it is
worthwhile to conduct arrests in a procedurally fair manner.
Another obstacle to reform is that potential suspects may not be
particularly receptive to police efforts to appear fair. Some citizens,
particularly those from communities whose members have long
been discriminated against and otherwise mistreated by the
system, may see fair treatment by the police as an inherent
contradiction in terms. 9 7
This obstacle may be particularly acute within the framework of
mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies. For example, it
seems likely that a suspect's sense of dignity would be undermined,
rather than enhanced, when faced with a uniform government
response that cannot be tailored to individual variations in
circumstances. This problem might arise when a suspect is told that
he must be arrested, regardless of the circumstances surrounding
his actions, or, similarly, when a defendant learns that an Assistant
District Attorney "cannot" dismiss the case against him so long as
it can be proven in court, regardless of the relative merits of
pursuing the particular prosecution.
Similarly, when an officer is required to arrest, it may be
particularly difficult for him to communicate credibly that he is
willing to listen to the participants' stories and take them
seriously. 9 Under a "should arrest" policy, in contrast, this kind of
195. Julius Lang, Building Partnerships Between Law Enforcement and the Courts,
Address to the New York Midtown Community Court Community Policing Focus Group
(Mar. 14, 1997).
196. Id
197. Most people believe that, "in addition to performing ... varied and valuable social
functions, [police officers] sometimes abuse their authority: they can enforce law in a
discriminatory fashion; they can harass and be unduly brutal; they can be corrupted and
become confederates of criminals rather than upholders of law." JONATHAN D. CASPER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 37 (1972).
198. While the simple act of giving voice to one's view-regardless of impact-might
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listening would be more consistent with the officer's job of deciding
whether a case is one in which arrest may not be appropriate. A
shift to a should arrest policy would increase incentives for police
to truly listen, rather than to do so merely as a hollow gesture made
in the hope of increasing future compliance.
The adoption of more flexible, responsive criminal justice policies
makes sense from the victim's psychological perspective as well.
Many victims feel deeply ambivalent about their abusive partners.
A woman may love her partner but also be afraid of him. She may
want to stop the violence but not want him to go to jail. This
"fluctuating readiness to consider change" makes an ambivalent
person extremely sensitive to the way in which she is approached
by a government official.' 99 In the mandatory arrest and prosecution
context, state officials necessarily emphasize one side of this
internal conflict. By insisting that she prosecute her partner, they
frequently push her to focus on the other side of her ambivalence," 0
with the unintended effect of encouraging her connection with the
batterer. Pro-arrest and pro-prosecution policies, in contrast, build
in somewhat greater flexibility for holding the victim's ambivalence
by recognizing the complexity ofher situation and thus evoking less
resistance from her.
Far more data must be accumulated before one could definitively
conclude that the procedural justice literature alone supports a
shift from criminal justice mandates to preferences.20' And the risks
inherent in basing social policy on insufficient data are wellillustrated by the rapid law reform efforts that followed the
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and were implemented
before the replication studies cast doubt on its results. But given
enhance satisfaction when the audience is ajudge, whose fimction is to maintain an unbiased
neutrality, Lind et al., supra note 159, at 952-53, it might be far less satisfying when the
audience is a police officer or prosecutor, whose interests are commonly viewed as directly
contrary to those ofthe accused.
199. MILLER & ROLLNICK, supranote 188, at 36.
200. The role played by ambivalence in a person's motivation to change is explored in
detail in id. at 157-67.
201. Indeed, the only study to focus specifically on domestic violence considered only the
police response. See supratext accompanying notes 174-84. Data obtained in other contexts,
however, strongly suggests that similar results will arise when researchers investigate the
impact of prosecutors, judges, and other system actors. See supratext accompanying notes
151-54.
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that the advantages gained through obligatory arrest and
prosecution also may be gleaned from other approaches, which are
less likely to have a dampening effect on procedural justice for
perpetrators, 20 2 it is appropriate to begin a dialogue about moving
away from mandates.
2. EnhancingVictim Safety by Shifting from Mandates to
Preferences
What might be lost in a shift away from mandates? As described
above, victim advocates have articulated two particularly strong
arguments in support of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution.
First, these policies empower the victim, alleviating her of
responsibility for criminal justice system intervention. In the
abuser's presence, the victim lacks the emotional space and physical
and psychological safety to make a well-considered, self-protective
decision. 0 3 Second, these policies send a strong symbolic message
state condemns intimate abuse and will protect its
that the
20 4
victims.
It may well be possible to provide these advantages to victims
and simultaneously facilitate the compliance-generating elements
of procedural justice. A number of recent studies indicate that
mandating state usurpation of the victim's role is not the only
answer.2 0 5 By offering assistance aimed specifically at the difficulties battered women face, police and prosecutors could help
victims reach a place where their ability to decide for themselves
would no longer be comprised. In so doing, the state would reinforce
the symbolic message sent to the community: we will protect
victims of domestic violence, both by prosecuting batterers and by
providing victims with the resources they need to meaningfully
participate in the journey to safety.
How can the criminal justice system maximize battered women's
ability to engage in optimal decision making? Recent research
202. See infra text accompanying notes 203-16.
203. See supratext accompanying note 103.
204. See supratext accompanying note 99. The other argument for mandates-that they
effectively reduce domestic violence-has received only mixed support from the research
data. See supratext accompanying notes 114-17.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 207-19.
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indicates that one important strategy is to offer victims extensive
legal and nonlegal advocacy services. Such advocacy includes:
providing information about and access to a wide range of social
services; strengthening victims' emotional support network;
about the civil and criminal justice systems;
providing information
20 6
and safety planning.
Advocacy services can increase a victim's perceptions of social
support, improve her mental health, and increase her physical and
psychological safety. In a recent study, college students were
trained to provide intensive, nonlegal advocacy services 2°7 to
battered women leaving a shelter. Advocates helped women access
community resources such as housing, employment, legal assistance, transportation, child care, health care, and counseling for
their children. °8 After ten weeks, women in the advocacy group
reported improvements in social support, greater effectiveness in
obtaining necessary resources, less depression, fear and anxiety,
and a better quality of life than those in the comparison group. 0 9
Most importantly, these women experienced less physical and
psychological abuse, and those who wished to end their 2abusive
1
relationships were significantly more effective in doing so.
Such advocacy services can, in turn, increase the degree to which
victims are willing to cooperate with the criminal justice system. In
one study, survivors with better access to tangible support were
approximately twice as likely to voluntarily participate in the
prosecutions of their intimate partners.2 1 '
Advocates also can reverse a victim's sense of social isolation
and improve her sense of emotional well-being. Such assistance
is particularly important for battered women, whose support

206. Id.
207. Each woman was assigned a college student volunteer who served as her advocate
for six hours a week, over ten weeks. CrisM. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee,Reducing Violence
Using Community-Based Advocacy for Women With Abusive Partners,67 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 43, 45 (1999).

208. Id.
209. Id. at 48-50.
210. Id.
211. Lisa A. Goodman et al., Obstacles to Victims' Cooperation With the Criminal
Prosecutionof TheirAbusers: The Role ofSocial Support, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 427,437
(1999). In this study, victim cooperation was defined as providing necessary information to
prosecutors and expressing a willingness to testify. Id. at 433.
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networks often are methodically undermined during an abusive
relationship.2" In a recent evaluation of law school domestic
violence clinics, battered women reported that their student
advocates actively worked on their behalf to repair such relationships as they talked to family and friends during pretrial
investigation.2 1 ' The victims reported an increased sense of

emotional support that was significantly greater than that among
women who did not receive similar intensive advocacy services.2 14
In addition, women in the advocacy group reported substantially
lower levels of physical and psychological re-abuse, despite the fact
that they had similar amounts of contact with their abusive
partners during the study period.215
These results indicate that in many cases, facilitating victim
access to resources and support from family, friends, and trained
personnel may more than compensate for any disempowerment
caused by a move from mandatory to preferred arrest and prosecution. In particular, advocacy services create similar benefits as
do mandatory arrests: an increase in physical safety and the
emotional space and empowerment necessary to engage in highquality decision making.
An emphasis on advocacy has additional victim-centered
procedural justice benefits. Research has shown that a woman who
experiences government officials as listening to her story and
responding to her individual needs is more likely to feel treated
fairly, and therefore to cooperate with prosecutors' requests, than
is a woman who feels forced into a mandatory model dismissive of
her input.216 In contrast, limited communication opportunities lead
victims to bypass the criminal justice system altogether. A study of
victims who were re-assaulted in the aftermath of a prosecution
found that sixty-seven percent ofthose victims who wished to speak

212. Sullivan & Bybee, supra note 207, at 43-44.
213. Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, SupportingBatteredWomen Involved with the
Court System: An Evaluation of a Law School-Based Advocacy Intervention, in VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author) (study focused on advocacy work
provided by the Georgetown University Law Center's Domestic Violence Clinic, which the
author directs, and the Catholic University's Families and the Law Clinic).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Erez & Belknap, supra note 161, at 264; Ford & Regoli, supranote 50, at 157-60.
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to prosecutors about the original case but were unable to do so
failed to report the subsequent assault.217
To appropriately encourage victim participation in criminal
litigation, prosecutors' offices should provide comprehensive
advocacy services and referrals from the moment a case is filed,
either within their own office or through referrals to private
advocacy groups. s These services should include drug and alcohol
counseling, psychological assistance, support groups, child care
services, referrals to shelters, and economic assistance through
state crime victims' compensation funds.

219

Advocates also could

convene a victim's friends and family members to assist in
strengthening damaged relationships and weakened bonds of
support.
3. Expanding the Defense Attorney Role
Defense attorneys play a critical role in the provision of
procedural justice. Increased opportunity to speak to an attorney
improves defendant perceptions that the trial process is a fair
one.220 These lawyers therefore are in a special position to assist in
the effort to promote their clients' compliance with court orders.
A defense attorney can promote procedural justice by spending
sufficient time with a client to allow for a full articulation of his
point of view, thus promoting his "voice"; by communicating respect
for the client's dignity; and by providing a detailed overview, in
advance, of the justice system process, promoting consistency.
These ideas may sound like simply good lawyering, but many court217. Gerald T. Hotaling & Eve Buzawa, The Response to Victim Preferences by the
Criminal Justice System and the Reporting of Re-victimization (July 25, 2001) (paper
presented at the 7th International Family Violence Research Conference).
218. Most of the research on the impact of advocacy services has focused on
nongovernmental advocacy groups. It is unclear whether victim advocates, employed by the
government and working in tandem with the prosecution, would be able to produce similar
results. If not, prosecutors would have to form close relationships with, and assist with

funding for, private providers of intensive advocacy services.
219. Linda Mills has suggested some similar reforms in arguing that state actors should
adopt a clinically based "survivor-centered model" of intervention that promotes a more
respectful relationship with battered women. Mills, supra note 45, at 597-609. Mills also
suggests important additional resources needed by victims who face particular religious,
cultural, or other obstacles. Id. at 598-600.
220. Casper et al., supra note 159, at 498.
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appointed defense attorneys, who are paid too little and,
accordingly,
take on far too many cases, fail to make the time to do
221
this work.
Defense attorneys can protect their own clients' interests by
increasing the chances that they will not run afoul of the law in the
future. So although it must be tempting for defense counsel to share
with clients their sense that the justice system is operating in an
unfair manner, it is at least as important to let clients know when
they believe a judge has acted fairly, a prosecutor is being
reasonable, or a sentence is not overly harsh. Whether these
moments are few or frequent, discussing them with a defendant
could promote his future compliance with the court's directives and
thus ultimately reduce the chances that he will recidivate and face
additional criminal charges.
Defense counsel can further assist their clients beyond the
particular case at bar by taking on the role of advisor as well as
defender. To fill this role, defense attorneys must educate themselves about the dynamics of intimate partner abuse, particularly
findings that domestic violence typically increases in both severity
and frequency over time.2 22 Defense attorneys' special position of
trust allows them to effectively communicate this information to
their clients, along with advice about preventive measures to help
clients avoid reabuse and subsequent, more serious criminal
charges. Defendants need to fully comprehend the advantages of
complying with a civil protection order, as well as participating in
counseling programs designed to deal with the violence, or with
drug and alcohol abuse. Multidisciplinary public defender offices
might be a valuable model for this approach.2
221. David Luban, Are CriminalDefenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993);
Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., A Measure of Our Justice System: A Look at Maine's Indigent

CriminalDefense Delivery System, 48 ME. L. REV. 335 (1996); Jane Fritsch & David Rohde,
Two.Tier Justice:FacingLife in Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 1.
222. See supranote 139.
223. Attorneys at Neighborhood Defender of Harlem, for example, regularly refer
defendant-clients to staff social workers who screen clients for social service needs by
gathering information on the client's family background, substance abuse, and mental health
history. Social workers write presentencing and prepleading reports for the clients. Social
workers continue to follow up with clients post-adjudication. For example, a social worker
would refer a domestic violence offender to a batterer treatment program, whether or not
attendance is court ordered. Telephone Interview with Alexis Carrero, Staff Social Worker,
Neighborhood Defender of Harlem (Aug. 3,2001).
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Such conversations may be particularly difficult with batterer
clients, because of their tendency to deny, minimize, and externalize blame for their actions. 21 Specialized training from mental
health professionals about how to engage in productive discussions
about these issues might be useful.
B. The Judiciary
Procedural justice research leads to valuable lessons for judges
in civil and criminal domestic violence cases. Issuance of civil
protection orders or orders setting conditions of pretrial release or
probation mean little if batterers view them as illegitimate and
therefore feel free to ignore them. Judges who recognize and
respond to defendants' normative concerns can exercise their
authority more effectively; their rules and decisions are more likely
to be voluntarily accepted and inspire compliance. As a result,
judicial training must be targeted toward promoting a sense of fair
process among defendants.
Domestic violence training programs for judges focus almost
exclusively on how to better understand and respond to victims;
virtually no information is provided on how to better communicate
neutrality and respect for defendants.2 5 Even discussions of how
judges should respond to the special needs of pro se parties-an
issue that is particularly significant in protection order casestypically is limited to ways
in which the court can best assist
26
unrepresented victims.
This disparity in emphasis stems in large part from the fact that
bias, against and mistreatment of victims, not batterers, is a far
more serious and well-documented problem among members of the
judiciary. 227 This problem persists in the courts today.228 But to
224. See infra text accompanying notes 258-60.
225. E.g., THE FAMILYVIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT
CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION (Jacqueline Agtuca et al. eds., 1992).
226. Id. at 149-52. The topic of"unrepresented parties" in this model curriculum includes
thoughtful information about how court clerks can assist petitioners to fill out forms and
accomplish service of process, and how judges can encourage local attorneys to represent
victims. Id. The only mention of unrepresented respondents, however, is a paragraph
asserting that generally they have no right to appointed counsel in protection order cases.
Id. at 151.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 69-79. Given that bias in favor of batterers has
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maximize victim safety through batterer compliance with nocontact and no-assault directives, with custody and visitation
awards, with counseling requirements, and with other conditions
of release, judges also must be trained to promote perceptions of
procedural justice among accused perpetrators.
One way that judges can accomplish this goal is to take the time
to describe the trial process, as well as the applicable substantive
law, at the outset of a hearing. As discussed infra, increased
information can be important to a litigant's sense of fairness.2 2 9
Concerns for judicial economy and the overwhelming number of
cases on most protection order and criminal misdemeanor calendars
may dictate that such information cannot be provided in every
individual case. Instead, a judge may choose to begin each court
session with a general description of case procedures, addressed to
all of the litigants assigned to trial that day.
Judges also must provide sufficient time for each defendant to
tell his story. Providing perpetrators with a sense of voice can have
a profound impact on compliance."s As with police officers, judges
must learn to communicate a willingness to understand and an
openness to considering a defendant's version of the case. As
discussed supra, this requires a demonstration that the judge is
present in the moment and is attending to the defendant without
distraction.23 This may be particularly challenging in civil
protection order cases involving unrepresented parties. Pro se
litigants often have trouble remaining focused on legally relevant
details; this can be quite frustrating for a judge with a crowded
docket. Clear instructions from the court, however, about the kinds
of facts that may be presented, communicated with patience and
sensitivity, can help to alleviate this problem. Finally, by clearly
long been the norm, this may be a relatively limited problem. My own observations indicate
that the issue arises primarily among judges who generally treat pro se litigants in a
disrespectful manner. Another potential source is well-meaning judges who have undergone
extensive domestic violence training, taken the lessons to heart, and are now working hard
to increasevictims' sense ofcomfortinthe courtroom. Occasionally, one ofthesejudges bends
over backwards to encourage victims to feel comfortable and, in so doing, creates an
atmosphere of unfair disparity.
228. See supranote 131.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 237-44.
230. See supratext accompanying notes 146-48.
231. See supratext accompanying notes 187-88.
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communicating the court's rulings and the findings that support
them, a judge may improve the sense of dignity and respect that
defendants take away from the courthouse.
Another procedural justice problem area for judges is the trend
to rely on "dangerousness assessments" to determine an appropriate sentence or to set the terms of civil protection orders. 2
These research tools were developed to assist victims in predicting
the likelihood that the violence in a relationship will recur and
escalate. Victims whose intimate partners have a high dangerousness score are
encouraged to engage in particularly extensive
233
safety planning.
Over the past ten years, however, courts across the country have
begun to use these instruments to increase terms of imprisonment,
deny probation and parole, and require supervision of visitation
sessions with childrenY 4 Defense attorneys and others have raised
significant concerns with this practice. Most troubling is the fact
that no empirical data currently are available to demonstrate the
predictive validity of dangerousness assessments." 5 In addition, the
instruments typically are administered by untrained personnel on
faulty and incomplete sources of information. 6 Judicial decision
making on the basis of such a problematic information source is
likely to create a perception among defendants that they have not
been provided consistent treatment in the justice system-a
fundamental component of procedural justice. Judges must refrain
from utilizing these instruments for purposes other than victim
safety planning.

232. STATEJUSTICEINST., CURRENTUSE OFDANGEROUSNESSASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING
DOMESTICVIOLENCE OFFENDERS: FINALREPORT 12 (JanRoehl & Kristin Guertin eds., 1998).
Dangerousness assessments are also used, with similarly problematic results, by prosecutors
making charging decisions. Id.
233. Id. at 1.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 14.
236. Id.
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C. The Civil Justice System

1. Expanding the Information Provided to Perpetrators
Batterer education could help increase compliance with civil
protection orders. The vast majority of accused abusers in these
cases are not represented by counsel" and they have little or no
access to advocacy services. Courthouse personnel typically will not
answer their questions on the grounds that they are prohibited
from giving legal advice. Further, although "know your rights"
guides, informational videos, and community education workshops
targeted at assisting victims have proliferated across the country,
few if any exist for the perpetrator community.
Many unrepresented parties do not comprehend the way the legal
system operates, the roles of various system players, or the nature
of their own obligations." 8 Defendants in civil protection order
cases who have any background understanding of the justice
system typically have experience only with criminal procedure;
very few have even a vague sense of what to expect in a civil
case. Like victims, they "don't differentiate at all--or if they do,
they differentiate incorrectly--between the civil and criminal
systems." 9 On the morning of a civil protection order trial, most
respondents expect to receive appointed counsel; they are concerned
that a protection order will add to their criminal record; and some
mistakenly believe that the judge may incarcerate them if an order
is issued. 40 Moreover, they rarely understand in advance that the
court appearance to which they have been summoned will be a trial,
so they typically are unprepared and lack witnesses or other forms
of supporting evidence.
237. See supra note 134.
238. Engler, supra note 134, at 103-04, 112, 127-28. As one example, Professor Engler
recounts a story about an unrepresented defendant in an eviction action who concluded a
discussion with the landlord's lawyer by saying, "Thank you, Your Honor." Id. at 110.
239. Ph.D. candidate, Lauren Bennett, Remarks to District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's
Office, Domestic Violence Training (Dec. 12, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
240. This observation, and the others in this paragraph, are based on my experience in
negotiating protection orders in hundreds of civil protection order cases and several years
of directing D.C.'s Emergency Domestic Relations Project, which until November 1996 was
responsible for handling all pretrial protection order cases for pro se victims in the District
of Columbia.

1898

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 43:1843

This dearth of information affects several procedural justice
factors. First, it is difficult to believe that one is receiving consistent
treatment from the court without understanding what to expect or
how the system functions. A defendant who confuses civil and
criminal procedure is particularly likely to feel that he is the victim
of inconsistent treatment when he learns that he has no right to
appointed counsel and the standard of proof is far lower than
beyond a reasonable doubt. To correct these problems, defendants
must be informed about the appropriate legal basis of a claim,
applicable legal defenses, available relief, pretrial settlement
negotiation options (and their advisability), the kinds of witnesses
and other sources of evidence that would be useful to present at
trial, and referral sources for low-cost or free legal advice.241
Second, if speaking to an attorney gives a litigant an increased
sense of "voice,"242 then so might the receipt of other, less resourceintensive forms of information and legal advice, such as lay
advocacy, educational pamphlets, and community education
workshops.

243

Third, in jurisdictions where victims have access to

some (even if limited) lay advocacy services, 2 " perpetrators might
perceive the existence of analogous, defense-oriented assistance as
evidence of the court's neutrality as well as the justice system's
respect for the accused. Finally, better-informed defendants might
find it easier to maintain a sense of dignity and fairness as they
navigate the civil protection order process.
Providing more information to respondents could be done in a
fairly simple, low-cost manner. When the court provides a copy of
the civil protection order complaint for service of process, clerks
could attach a form containing essential information and referrals.
241. These topics frequently are amongthose included in victim advocacy guides. See, e.g.,
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA (Deborah Epstein ed., 2001).

242. See supratext accompanying notes 146-48.
243. Of course, the best way to educate and inform respondents about the civil protection
order system is to ensure that they are all represented by counsel. A system in which both
victims and respondents have access to attorneys would constitute an enormous
improvement over the current, predominantly pro se procedure. But given the enormous
costs of such a solution, it is unlikely that this will occur in the near future.
244. Such assistance for victims is still far too limited and under-funded. The majority of
domestic violence service providers nationwide report that victim demand far exceeds the
number of advocates. Kinports & Fischer, supranote 75, at 173. Still, a greater number of
victims than respondents have access to such services. Id.
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Receiving such information directly from the court may be
particularly beneficial in improving defendants' impressions of the
court's neutrality in these cases. More in-depth information guides
about how to put on a defense in a protection order case should be
drafted and widely distributed, as have analogous materials geared
toward the legal rights of battered women. Defense attorneys could
accept pro bono referrals for particularly complex cases, train lay
advocates to staff a telephone information line to answer questions,
or accompany defendants to court.
Of course, a-better-informed respondent community may mean
an increase in the percentage of contested protection order cases,
making this emergency process a greater ordeal for some battered
women. But if perpetrators will be more likely to abide by these
orders, the victim community will be far better off.
2. Expandingthe PretrialNegotiationProcess
In most jurisdictions, parties in civil protection order cases
have the opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations
immediately prior to trial. 245 Designed primarily to alleviate the
court's trial docket, this process tends to be conducted under tight
time restrictions and with institutional pressure on negotiators to
produce the maximum possible number of settled cases. 246 The
overwhelming majority of participants are pro se, and lay advocates
are rarely, if ever, available. 7
These limitations miniTie the procedural justice benefits of a
negotiation. Alternative dispute resolution research shows that
perceptions offair treatment are linked to a participant's belief that
he was given an opportunity to state his case, the full spectrum of
relevant issues was aired, and the officiant listened to and made
genuine efforts to understand the concerns raised.' s In a rushed,
understaffed 9 procedure that occurs just moments or hours before
245. Telephone Interview with Juley Fulcher, Public Policy Director, National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (July 23, 2001).
246. Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse,
37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 578-80 (1988).
247. Epstein, supranote 2, at 25-26.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
249. In the District of Columbia, for example, two court negotiators attempt to resolve an
average of thirty cases per day. Telephone Interview with Paul Roddy, Director, Domestic
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trial, there is little chance that these goals will be accomplished. If
spending additional time allowing defendants to air their views and
responding to their concerns would improve future compliance, the
court should provide the resources needed to support such program
expansion.25
The negotiation process could be further improved from a
procedural justice vantage point through the participation of
trained advocates who could offer litigants strategic advice and
emotional support. An expansion of the current, inadequate
advocacy pool 1 would be valuable for both sides. For defendants,
it would increase the opportunity to feel heard, understood, and
respected. For victims, it would reduce the power disparity that2
makes it so difficult to remain firm in their bargaining positions.
V. CAUTIONARY NOTES

Refocusing the battered women's movement strategy to
incorporate notions of procedural justice appears to be a promising
avenue for increasing victim safety. But two special issues must be
carefully considered before generalizing from the existing literature
to the family abuse context.

Violence Unit, D.C. Superior Court (July 24,2001).
250. Negotiators in domestic violence cases must be careful to avoid shifting into a
mediation paradigm, which experts agree is inappropriate in intimate abuse cases. E.g.,
Karla Fischer et al., The Culture ofBatteringand the Role ofMediation in Domestic Violence
Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993). It is too dangerous to assume a level playing field and
roughly equal power balance between two parties when one has been the victim of violence
or threats perpetrated by the other. Id. at 2161-62. To avoid this problem, court-sponsored
civil protection order negotiations typically are conducted in relay fashion, with the primary
focus on the relief available to the petitioner at trial and whether the two parties can agree
to her requests. See id. at 2168-69. For an excellent discussion of this issue see Trina Grillo,
The MediationAlternative:ProcessDamagesfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
251. Kinports & Fischer, supra note 75, at 173 (noting that the majority of domestic
violence service providers nationwide report that victim demand for advocates far exceeds
their availability).
252. Given the current dearth of victim advocates, any expansion would have to occur on
behalf of both parties. An increase in advocacy for perpetrators alone would further tip the
power imbalance between abuser and victim and greatly harm victim access to justice and
safety.
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A. Special Characteristicsof the BattererPopulation:The
PotentialEffect on ProceduralJustice
Because most existingproceduraljustice data have been collected

outside of the domestic violence context, a question must be raised:
Can we generalize from these studies to predict the future
compliance of those who abuse their intimate partners? Batterers
may differ from other groups examined in the procedural justice
literature, which includes misdemeanants, traffic offenders, and
participants in custody disputes, in myriad ways. They may have
different expectations about case procedures and outcomes,
especially given the justice system's long record of failing to hold
abusers accountable2 53 and the defense bar's perceptions that the
newly reformed system is fundamentally biased against their
clients.2 " They may have different levels of attachment to the
governmental system of which police, prosecutors, and judges are
a part, arising out of their own childhood experiences, either of
being victimized themselves by an adult family member,"5 or of
watching one parent abused by the other with no effective official
intervention."8 Finally, they may have different values, such as
disproportionately favoring the use of aggression in marriage. 257
Each of these potential variances could affect the way in which

253. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 50-53.
254. See supra text accompanying note 124.

255. Although the relationship between experiences ofmaltreatment as a child and adult
domestic violence is relatively unexplored, the data suggest that children who experience
maltreatment have an increased risk of committing a violent crime. Cathy Spatz Widom,
Child Abuse and Alcohol Use and Abuse, in ALCOHOL AND INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE:
FOSTERING MULTIDISCIPLINARYPERSPECTVES 291 (S.E. Martin ed., 1992).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21, 50-53 for a brief history of the state's
failure to respond to domestic violence situations.
257. Studies have found that batterers are more likely to articulate favorable views of
aggression in marriage. Although some data indicate that men who feel strongly about
traditional sex role stereotypes have higher levels of marital aggression, other data do not.
Compare Donald G. Saunders et al., The Inventory of Beliefs about Wife Beating: The
Construction and Initial Validation of a Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes, 2 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 39 (1987) (concluding that negative attitudes toward battered women are linked
with traditional views of women's roles), with Peter H. Neidig et al., Attitudinal
CharacteristicsofMales Who Have Engagedin Spouse Abuse, 1 J. FAM.VIOLENCE 223 (1986)
(concluding that abusive males are not more likely to hold traditional views of women's

roles).
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perpetrators evaluate their contacts with justice system officials
and, in turn, their future compliance.
A growing literature on the cognitive psychological processes of
batterers further supports the need to proceed with caution here.
For example, in a recent series of studies, cognitive psychologists
examined whether deficits in information processing cause
batterers to misconstrue social stmuli. 5 8 The data indicate that
violent male spouses are more likely than others 9 to offer
external, shifting attributions for their behavior. Rather than
accepting responsibility themselves, batterers tend to minimize,

deny, rationalize, or blame the victim for their violence."' Batterers
also are more likely to have unrealistic expectations and irrational
beliefs that increase the likelihood ofmarital anger and aggression.
For example, they tend to think in rigid, dichotomous categories
of acceptable and unacceptable behavior; articulate absolutist
demands that others act "appropriately"; magnify the importance
of negative situations; and
make arbitrary inferences in the absence
26
of confirming evidence. '
Because cognitive psychologists believe that such emotionally
influenced thought distortions are instinctual, they may occur
across a wide variety of provocative situations, 22 including arrests
and courtroom proceedings. If maritally violent men actively
misconstrue or otherwise distort situations in ways that cause them
258. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, SocialSkill Deficits in MaritallyViolent Men: Interpreting
the Data Using a Social InformationProcessingModel, 12 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 605, 607

(1992).
259. Several of these studies compared abusers to two different control groups: maritally
distressed, nonviolent men and maritally satisfied, nonviolent men. E.g., id.

260. DANIEL J. SONKIN ET AL., THE MALE BATIERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH 42 (1985);
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 96-98 (1984) (finding that forty-two
to sixty-nine percent of women report that their partners justified, rationalized, explained,
or apologized after violent incident; percentages decreased with length of abusive behavior);
Christopher I. Eckhardt et al., ArticulatedThoughtsofMaritallyViolent andNonviolentMen
DuringAnger Arousal, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 259 (1998); Nancy M. Shields
& Christine R. Haneke, Attribution Processes in Violent Relationships: Perceptions of
Violent Husbandsand Their Wives, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 515 (1983) (violent husbands

were less likely than theirwives to see their violence as attributable to themselves). Abusers'
tendency to excuse behavior appears to apply equally to both violent and nonviolent
behavior. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., Violent Married Couples'Attributionsfor Violent
and Nonviolent Self and PartnerBehaviors, in BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT 53, 59 (1992).
261. Holtzworth-Munroe, supranote 258, at 605.
262. Eckhardt et al., supra note 260, at 260, 266.
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to experience a higher frequency of anger arousal and threat
provocation,1 3 their perceptions regarding the provisions of
procedural justice may be different than those of the population
groups studied in the existing literature. 4
It is also possible that batterers' cognitive distortions, when
applied to the legal system, are exacerbated by interactions with
defense counsel. Predictably, attorneys representing accused
perpetrators in criminal and civil protection order cases have
opposed reforms designed to improve the system's response to
battered women. 5 Perpetrators' tendencies to attribute responsibility externally, make arbitrary inferences, and exaggerate
negativity may be encouraged when their attorneys--correctly or
incorrectly-articulate the position that the court system is biased
and unfair.
The recent domestic violence arrest reevaluation study forms a
solid basis for concluding that procedural justice does affect
batterer compliance. But future research efforts should focus
further on this particular population group to identify potential
applicability hurdles from general population studies.
B. The Victim's Perspective:A PotentialDeterminantof the
Impact of ProceduralJustice
Accurate analysis of procedural justice effects on abusive
intimate partners must entail consideration of the perspective and
role of the victim. Unlike research focusing on stranger, or
"victimless" crimes, any study of batterer compliance may be
confounded by variables in victim behavior.26 6 When an arrest
263. Id. at 266.
264. This theory is bolstered somewhat by a study oflong-term compliance with mediated
divorce agreements, in which researchers found that escalation of a dispute prior to
mediation was inversely related to long-term compliance. Pruitt et al., supra note 170, at
322. Prior escalation was measured on the basis of two factors: an observer's rating of the
worst incident mentioned during mediation and the participants' self-assessments of their
hostility levels at the outset of mediation. Id. at 320. But see Harrell & Smith, supra note
130, at 50 (finding that severity ofmost recent incident of physical violence prior to victim's
filing for civil protection order did not predict the batterer's failure to comply).
265. See supratext accompanying note 124.
266. Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman has criticized the domestic violence arrest
experiments of the late 1980s on similar grounds. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest
Experiments:A Feminist Critique,83 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992).
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occurs in which the police use derogatory language and embarrass
the accused in front of friends and neighbors, the victim might
experience a sense of shame within her community for failing to
keep her marriage strong or be accused of "causing" another
member of a minority group to enter the criminal justice system.Y
Or it might be that police officers who subject a suspect to unfair
and disrespectful treatment also are responding similarly to the
victim. Either scenario could decrease the victim's incentive to
report subsequent abuse, thus artificially lowering the reported
recidivism rate. The police behavior described above also could
push the victim to remain with her abusive partner; this proximity
alone could result in a higher rate of future noncompliance.
Data documenting recidivism therefore could reflect the victim's
alienation from, or satisfaction with, the procedural fairness of the
justice system, rather than, or in addition to, any impact on the
perpetrator. Future studies must take the victim's crucial role into
account so that it is possible to determine whether efforts to
improve procedural justice for perpetrators can be implemented in
tandem with efforts to promote victim empowerment and safety.
Such studies could shed important additional light on the factors
affecting batterer compliance.2 69
CONCLUSION

The legal achievements of the battered women's movementincluding mandatory arrest, no-drop prosecution, and the Model
Code on Domestic and Family Violence-have dramatically
267. Epstein, supra note 2, at 17-18.
268. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The PreventiveImpactsofPoliciesforProsecuting
Wife Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 52, at 181, 200, 202-03 (finding that
during the six months following criminal charges, women who continued to live with their
abusive partners for any period of time were more likely to be battered anew).
269. Similarly, one must consider whether the victim was living with the perpetrator at

the outset of the justice system intervention and, if so, whether she managed to find
alternative, safe housing before he returned. Professor Bowman raises this point in the
context of a critique of the mandatory arrest studies. Bowman, supranote 266, at 205. If a
victim is able to escape to a safe and secret location, recidivism is less likely than if she
remains trapped in a shared residence with her abusive partner. This factor is complicated

by evidence that when a battered woman attempts to leave the relationship, she is at
greatest risk of serious reabuse or homicide, a concept that Martha Mahoney has termed
"separation assault." Mahoney, supra note 64, at 64-79.
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improved victims' access to justice and the likelihood that perpetrators will be held accountable. At the same time, however, each
of these reforms has contributed to a substantial reduction in the
procedural justice accorded to batterers.
Procedural justice demands that a defendant feel that he has an
opportunity to voice his side of the story, perceive that the relevant
authorities are neutral and unbiased, believe that the legal system
is consistent in its treatment of individuals and cases, and see that
officials are treating him with dignity and respect. Social science
studies show that these factors have a significant, independent
effect on the likelihood that an individual will comply with an
official directive. If a person feels fairly treated by state officials, he
will perceive them as more legitimate and, as a consequence, will
be more likely to obey their orders. This is true regardless of
whether he perceives an order to be right or wrong, and even if
compliance is counter to his immediate self-interest.
The procedural justice data indicate the existence of a close
connection between batterers' sense of fair treatment and victim
safety. If government power is exercised in a way that instills a
sense of procedural unfairness, it undermines the likelihood of
perpetrator compliance, putting victims of abuse at risk.
This conclusion necessitates a reassessment of current domestic
violence policies. The civil and criminal justice systems must better
communicate fundamental fairness and respect to batterers without
losing the enormous gains for victims that the past thirty years
have witnessed. Police officers are finally beginning to arrest
batterers, prosecutors are finally following through with criminal
cases, and judges are slowly becoming sensitized to the special
dynamics of intimate partner abuse. But now it is time to address
perpetrators' prevalent perceptions that "the system is against
them." This Article seeks to begin a dialogue about how to strike
this new balance: supporting battered women and encouraging
them in their efforts to obtain safety, while simultaneously
enhancing abusers' perceptions that justice system authorities are
sufficiently moral and legitimate to inspire compliance.

